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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 — @sigstore/verify

MEDIUM

GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-345 vulnerability in @sigstore/verify. A fix is available for @sigstore/verify — see the affected versions and patch details below.

sigstore-js has Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Also known asCVE-2026-48816
Published
Jul 1, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 28, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs4th percentile — riskier than 4% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 380,066 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

27other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@sigstore/verifynpm
11.7Mdownloads / week

Description

sigstore-js derives a transparency-log timestamp from tlogEntries[].integratedTime and uses it to validate certificate validity windows and satisfy timestampThreshold. For bundle v0.2, a tlog entry can be inclusionProof-only (no signed inclusionPromise/set), and the inclusion proof path does not cryptographically bind integratedTime. As a result, an attacker who can supply an untrusted bundle can influence time-based verification decisions by choosing integratedTime.

impact

If a consumer accepts attacker-provided bundle v0.2 inputs and relies on tlog-derived timestamps for certificate validity checks, verification can be influenced by an unauthenticated timestamp value. This is a trust gap: integratedTime is treated as a trusted observer timestamp under inclusionProof-only mode even though only the signed inclusionPromise/set path binds it.

affected code

  • packages/verify/src/bundle/index.ts (adds a transparency-log timestamp whenever integratedTime != 0)
  • packages/verify/src/timestamp/index.ts (converts integratedTime to a Date)
  • packages/verify/src/verifier.ts (verifies timestamps before verifying tlog inclusion)
  • packages/verify/src/tlog/index.ts + packages/verify/src/tlog/set.ts (only the inclusionPromise/set path binds integratedTime)

proof of concept

The attached poc.zip contains a self-contained harness that reproduces the behavior on the pinned commit and includes both a canonical test and a negative control.

repro:

  1. extract poc.zip into a fresh directory and run the make targets:
unzip poc.zip -d poc
cd poc/poc-F-SIG-JS-TLOGTIME-001
make canonical
make control
  1. confirm canonical.log includes:
[CALLSITE_HIT]:
[PROOF_MARKER]:
  1. confirm control.log includes:
[NC_MARKER]:

suggested fix

Only treat integratedTime as a trusted timestamp when it is cryptographically bound (for example, via a verified signed inclusionPromise/set). For inclusionProof-only entries, do not count integratedTime toward timestampThreshold, and do not use it for certificate validity decisions unless there is another signed time source (for example, an rfc3161 timestamp).

poc.zip PR_DESCRIPTION.md SUBMISSION.md

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@sigstore/verify≥ 3.1.0&&< 3.1.13.1.1npm install @sigstore/verify@3.1.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @sigstore/verify, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @sigstore/verify to 3.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

A flaw was found in sigstore-js. The tlog integratedTime field is not cryptographically bound in inclusionProof-only bundle v0.2 entries, allowing an attacker who supplies an untrusted bundle to influence time-based verification decisions.

Workaround published by Red Hat
Upgrade to the latest sigstore-js (>= 3.1.1) release that addresses GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

sigstore-js derives a transparency-log timestamp from `tlogEntries[].integratedTime` and uses it to validate certificate validity windows and satisfy `timestampThreshold`. For bundle v0.2, a tlog entry can be inclusionProof-only (no signed inclusionPromise/set), and the inclusion proof path does not cryptographically bind `integratedTime`. As a result, an attacker who can supply an untrusted bundle can influence time-based verification decisions by choosing `integratedTime`. ## impact If a consumer accepts attacker-provided bundle v0.2 inputs and relies on tlog-derived timestamps for certific
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-xgjw-pm74-86q4: @sigstore/verify | O3 Security