GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5
HIGHScriban has Uncontrolled Recursion in `object.to_json` Causing Unrecoverable Process Crash via StackOverflowException
Blast Radius
ScribanReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The object.to_json builtin function in Scriban performs recursive JSON serialization via an internal WriteValue() static local function that has no depth limit, no circular reference detection, and no stack overflow guard. A Scriban template containing a self-referencing object passed to object.to_json triggers unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that terminates the hosting .NET process. This is a fatal, unrecoverable crash — StackOverflowException cannot be caught by user code in .NET.
Details
The vulnerable code is the WriteValue() static local function at src/Scriban/Functions/ObjectFunctions.cs:494:
static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value)
{
var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object);
if (value is null || value is string || value is bool ||
type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable)
{
JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type);
}
else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) {
writer.WriteStartArray();
foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
WriteValue(context, writer, x); // recursive, no depth check
}
writer.WriteEndArray();
}
else {
writer.WriteStartObject();
var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value);
foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue))
{
writer.WritePropertyName(member);
WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue); // recursive, no depth check
}
}
writer.WriteEndObject();
}
}
This function has none of the safety mechanisms present in other recursive paths:
ObjectToString()atTemplateContext.Helpers.cs:98checksObjectRecursionLimit(default 20)EnterRecursive()atTemplateContext.cs:957callsRuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()CheckAbort()atTemplateContext.cs:464also callsEnsureSufficientExecutionStack()
The WriteValue() function bypasses all of these because it is a static local function that only takes the TemplateContext for member access — it never calls EnterRecursive(), never checks ObjectRecursionLimit, and never calls EnsureSufficientExecutionStack().
Execution flow:
- Template creates a ScriptObject:
{{ x = {} }} - Sets a self-reference:
x.self = x— stores a reference inScriptObject.Storedictionary - Pipes to
object.to_json:x | object.to_json→ callsToJson()at line 477 ToJson()callsWriteValue(context, writer, value)at line 488WriteValueenters theelsebranch (line 515), gets members via accessor, finds "self"TryGetValuereturnsxitself,WriteValuerecurses with the same object — infinite loopStackOverflowExceptionis thrown — fatal, cannot be caught, process terminates
PoC
{{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }}
In a hosting application:
using Scriban;
// This will crash the entire process with StackOverflowException
var template = Template.Parse("{{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }}");
var result = template.Render(); // FATAL: process terminates here
Even without circular references, deeply nested objects can exhaust the stack since no depth limit is enforced:
{{ a = {}
b = {inner: a}
c = {inner: b}
d = {inner: c}
# ... continue nesting ...
result = deepest | object.to_json }}
Impact
- Process crash DoS: Any application embedding Scriban for user-provided templates (CMS platforms, email template engines, report generators, static site generators) can be crashed by a single malicious template. The crash is unrecoverable —
StackOverflowExceptionterminates the .NET process. - No try/catch protection possible: Unlike most exceptions,
StackOverflowExceptioncannot be caught by application code. The hosting application cannot wraptemplate.Render()in a try/catch to survive this. - No authentication required:
object.to_jsonis a default builtin function (registered inBuiltinFunctions.cs), available in all Scriban templates unless explicitly removed. - Trivial to exploit: The PoC is a single line of template code.
Recommended Fix
Add a depth counter parameter to WriteValue() and check it against ObjectRecursionLimit, consistent with how ObjectToString is protected. Also add EnsureSufficientExecutionStack() as a safety net:
static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value, int depth = 0)
{
if (context.ObjectRecursionLimit != 0 && depth > context.ObjectRecursionLimit)
{
throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan,
$"Exceeding object recursion limit `{context.ObjectRecursionLimit}` in object.to_json");
}
try
{
RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack();
}
catch (InsufficientExecutionStackException)
{
throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan,
"Exceeding recursive depth limit in object.to_json, near to stack overflow");
}
var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object);
if (value is null || value is string || value is bool ||
type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable)
{
JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type);
}
else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) {
writer.WriteStartArray();
foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
WriteValue(context, writer, x, depth + 1);
}
writer.WriteEndArray();
}
else {
writer.WriteStartObject();
var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value);
foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue))
{
writer.WritePropertyName(member);
WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue, depth + 1);
}
}
writer.WriteEndObject();
}
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| .NETNuGet | Scriban | all versions | 7.0.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for Scriban. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update Scriban to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5 across NuGet dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.