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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh

MEDIUMFix: Sylius/MolliePlugin#351

GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-639 vulnerability in sylius/mollie-plugin. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Sylius Mollie Plugin has unauthenticated IDOR that leaks order token and customer PII

Also known asCVE-2026-68501
Published
Jul 31, 2026
Updated
Jul 31, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.09%
Lower risk than most CVEs36th percentile — riskier than 36% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.93%0.3%0.3%0.4%Aug 26Sep 26Sep 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 372,613 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐘sylius/mollie-plugin🐘sylius/mollie-plugin🐘sylius/mollie-plugin

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Two unauthenticated Mollie shop endpoints look up orders by a sequential integer orderId with no ownership or session check. Chained, they expose customer PII.

GET /{_locale}/thank-you (PageRedirectController::thankYouAction, route sylius_mollie_shop_thank_you_page_redirect) loads the order with findOneBy(['id' => $orderId]) and returns a 302 whose Location header carries that order's tokenValue. Any orderId thus yields that order's token. A non-existent id dereferences null and returns a 500. The handler also writes the raw orderId into the session.

GET /{_locale}/get-code (QrCodeAction::fetchQrCodeFromOrder, route sylius_mollie_shop_get_qr_code) runs the same lookup and returns the order's QR code and id as JSON, ignoring the session cart; this is where the front-end got the integer id. A bad id 500s here too.

That tokenValue is the order's only access control. Passed to the Sylius core page GET /{_locale}/register-after-checkout/{tokenValue} it returns a form pre-filled with the customer's first name, last name and email. The full attack: enumerate orderId, read the token from the redirect, read the PII, at roughly a 1-in-71 hit rate for guest orders. register-after-checkout is Sylius core, not the plugin, and trusts the token by design, so the leak is what must be fixed.

None of the plugin endpoints require a login, session or CSRF token.

Patches

Fixed in 2.2.8, 3.2.4 and 3.3.1.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch both endpoints at the project level by decorating the plugin controllers. The decorators enforce ownership before delegating to the original controller, so no plugin behaviour is lost. They keep the original orderId request contract, so no front-end or asset changes are required. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x.

Step 1. Decorate the QR code controller

Create src/Controller/Mollie/SecureQrCodeAction.php in your Sylius project:

<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\Controller\Mollie;

use Sylius\Component\Order\Context\CartContextInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Order\Context\CartNotFoundException;
use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\QrCodeAction;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response;

final class SecureQrCodeAction
{
    private const OWNED_ORDER_IDS_SESSION_KEY = 'sylius_mollie.owned_order_ids';

    public function __construct(
        private readonly QrCodeAction $inner,
        private readonly CartContextInterface $cartContext,
    ) {
    }

    public function fetchQrCodeFromOrder(Request $request): JsonResponse
    {
        $orderId = $request->get('orderId');

        try {
            $cart = $this->cartContext->getCart();
        } catch (CartNotFoundException) {
            $cart = null;
        }

        if (null !== $orderId && (null === $cart || (string) $cart->getId() !== (string) $orderId)) {
            return new JsonResponse([], Response::HTTP_FORBIDDEN);
        }

        if (null !== $cart && null !== $cart->getId() && $request->hasSession()) {
            $session = $request->getSession();
            $ownedIds = $session->get(self::OWNED_ORDER_IDS_SESSION_KEY, []);
            $ownedIds[(string) $cart->getId()] = true;
            $session->set(self::OWNED_ORDER_IDS_SESSION_KEY, $ownedIds);
        }

        return $this->inner->fetchQrCodeFromOrder($request);
    }

    public function createPayment(Request $request): Response
    {
        return $this->inner->createPayment($request);
    }

    public function removeQrCodeFromOrder(Request $request): JsonResponse
    {
        return $this->inner->removeQrCodeFromOrder($request);
    }
}

Step 2. Decorate the thank-you controller

Create src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePageRedirectController.php:

<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\Controller\Mollie;

use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\PageRedirectController;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\RedirectResponse;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Session\SessionInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Routing\RouterInterface;

final class SecurePageRedirectController
{
    private const OWNED_ORDER_IDS_SESSION_KEY = 'sylius_mollie.owned_order_ids';

    public function __construct(
        private readonly PageRedirectController $inner,
        private readonly RouterInterface $router,
    ) {
    }

    public function thankYouAction(Request $request, SessionInterface $session): RedirectResponse
    {
        $orderId = $request->get('orderId');

        if (null !== $orderId) {
            $ownedIds = $session->get(self::OWNED_ORDER_IDS_SESSION_KEY, []);

            if (!isset($ownedIds[(string) $orderId])) {
                return new RedirectResponse($this->router->generate('sylius_shop_cart_summary'));
            }
        }

        return $this->inner->thankYouAction($request, $session);
    }
}

Step 3. Register the decorators

Append to your project's config/services.yaml:

services:
    App\Controller\Mollie\SecureQrCodeAction:
        decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.qr_code
        public: true
        arguments:
            $inner: '@.inner'
            $cartContext: '@sylius.context.cart'

    App\Controller\Mollie\SecurePageRedirectController:
        decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.page_redirect
        public: true
        arguments:
            $inner: '@.inner'
            $router: '@router'

Both decorators keep @.inner and only add an ownership check on orderId before handing the request to the original action, so createPayment, removeQrCodeFromOrder and the thank-you redirect all keep their original behaviour and the front-end contract is unchanged.

Step 4. Clear the cache

bin/console cache:clear

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsylius/mollie-pluginall versions2.2.8
🐘Packagistsylius/mollie-plugin3.0.0&&< 3.2.43.2.4
🐘Packagistsylius/mollie-plugin3.3.0&&< 3.3.13.3.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sylius/mollie-plugin. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update sylius/mollie-plugin to 2.2.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Two unauthenticated Mollie shop endpoints look up orders by a sequential integer `orderId` with no ownership or session check. Chained, they expose customer PII. `GET /{_locale}/thank-you` (`PageRedirectController::thankYouAction`, route `sylius_mollie_shop_thank_you_page_redirect`) loads the order with `findOneBy(['id' => $orderId])` and returns a `302` whose `Location` header carries that order's `tokenValue`. Any `orderId` thus yields that order's token. A non-existent id dereferences null and returns a `500`. The handler also writes the raw `orderId` into the session. `GET /{_
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-x83g-979r-f5fh: CSRF (Medium 6.5) | O3 Security