CVE-2026-113727 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.4) CWE-639 vulnerability in github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. A fix is available for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OpenChoreo: Authorization bypass on WorkflowRun update allows cross-project takeover of workflow runs
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-113727.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-113727 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo🐹github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo🐹github.com/openchoreo/openchoreoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The OpenChoreo API server authorized PUT .../workflowruns/{runName} against ownership metadata taken from the request body, while the object it actually mutated was selected by the URL path. Nothing forced the two to agree.
A WorkflowRun's membership in a project and component is carried entirely by its openchoreo.dev/project and openchoreo.dev/component labels. Because the workflowrun:update check read those labels from the submitted object rather than the stored one, a caller holding workflowrun:update on one component could name a run belonging to a different project or component in the URL, supply labels for the component they legitimately control, pass the check, and have the unrelated run rewritten with their own ownership labels.
The namespace is taken from the URL and feeds both the authorization check and the Kubernetes read, so it cannot diverge. This is cross-project and cross-component escalation inside a single namespace, not a cross-tenant issue.
Impact
Rewriting the ownership labels transfers authority over the run. Every other WorkflowRun check (view, logs, events, status, delete, list) derives its scope from the stored labels, so once the write lands the policy engine legitimately grants the attacker access to an object they never had rights to. They can then:
- Read the victim's build logs. These stream raw pod logs from the workflow plane and routinely carry source paths, registry destinations, and credentials a build step echoed by accident.
- Read the run's Kubernetes events.
- Delete the run.
So the primary impact is confidentiality and availability, not only integrity. On the integrity side, spec.workflow.parameters can be overwritten on a pending run, and manipulating the two ownership labels can either wedge the run in a permanent ComponentValidationFailed condition or downgrade it to a standalone run that skips component validation.
Exploitation requires an authenticated caller with an AuthzRoleBinding or ClusterAuthzRoleBinding granting workflowrun:update at project or component scope in the victim's namespace, plus knowledge of the target run's name. An anonymous caller cannot reach this.
Patches
The authorization check now loads the stored WorkflowRun and derives every ownership attribute from it instead of from the request body. Separately, the openchoreo.dev/project and openchoreo.dev/component labels are now immutable on update, so an authorized caller cannot hand their own run to another project either.
| Line | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.x | 1.0.0 through 1.0.5 | 1.0.6 |
| 1.1.x | 1.1.0 through 1.1.6 | 1.1.7 |
| 1.2.x | 1.2.0 through 1.2.4 | 1.2.5 |
Upgrade to the patched release on your line. No configuration change is needed after upgrading.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict who holds workflowrun:update.
Audit your AuthzRole and ClusterAuthzRole definitions for that action and remove it from any role granted to principals you would not trust with write access to every workflow run in the namespace. Among the roles shipped with OpenChoreo, only the system role workload-publisher lists workflowrun:update explicitly, and admin holds it through its * wildcard. Custom roles in your own values file may also include it, so check those.
Treat any credential bound to workload-publisher as privileged. CI systems are the usual holder, and a leaked CI token is enough to run this.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo | ≥ 1.0.0&&< 1.0.6 | 1.0.6go get github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo@v1.0.6 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo | ≥ 1.1.0&&< 1.1.7 | 1.1.7go get github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo@v1.1.7 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo | ≥ 1.2.0&&< 1.2.5 | 1.2.5go get github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo@v1.2.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo to 1.0.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-113727 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-113727 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.