How severe is CVE-2026-73841?

CVE-2026-73841 has a CVSS score of 8.8/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by CVE-2026-73841?

CVE-2026-73841 affects the following packages: github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo (Go), github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix CVE-2026-73841?

Update github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo to 1.2.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73841 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect CVE-2026-73841 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate CVE-2026-73841 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is CVE-2026-73841 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for CVE-2026-73841 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for CVE-2026-73841?

CVE-2026-73841 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.8%, placing it in the 55th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-73841?

CVE-2026-73841 is classified as CWE-639 (CWE-639), CWE-863 (CWE-863). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was CVE-2026-73841 published, and has it been updated?

CVE-2026-73841 was published on August 13, 2026 and was last updated on September 27, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

HIGH severity

CVE-2026-73841 — openchoreo

HIGHFix: openchoreo/openchoreo@4d372ea

CVE-2026-73841 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-639 vulnerability in github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. A fix is available for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenChoreo: Cross-project command execution and wirelog view access via OpenChoreo openchoreo-api exec and wirelogs endpoints

Also known asGHSA-52gf-6rpq-fgmxGO-2026-6358

Published

Aug 13, 2026

Updated

Sep 27, 2026

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Sep 28, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-73841.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-73841 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 380,066 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

🐹github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo🐹github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The OpenChoreo API server (openchoreo-api) authorized requests to its exec and wirelogs endpoints against the project supplied by the caller in the request, rather than against the project that actually owns the target component. The target component was resolved by name only, and the authorization engine decided purely from the caller-supplied resource hierarchy — the component's real owning project was never checked. As a result, an authenticated user who holds a project-scoped exec or log-viewing grant on any single project could run commands in, and read the wirelogs of, components owned by other projects in the same namespace.

Impact

An authenticated tenant holding a project-scoped component:exec grant on just one project can execute arbitrary commands — including an interactive shell — inside the running pods of components owned by any other project in the same namespace. This exposes those workloads' environment variables and mounted Secrets (such as database credentials, API keys, and tokens), allows tampering with the workload, and enables further pivoting using the workload's own network position and credentials. The same flaw in the wirelogs endpoint lets a project-scoped wirelogs:view grant read any component's wirelogs in the namespace.

The blast radius is every component in the namespace, reachable from a single legitimate project grant. The boundary crossed is project-within-namespace: the request still pins the namespace, so the issue does not cross namespace boundaries. In effect this is a cross-project (cross-team) remote command-execution and data-access primitive available to any low-privileged tenant.

Patches

Fixed in 1.2.3 and 1.1.6. The fix aligns the exec and wirelogs endpoints with the pattern already used by other first-class component operations: the target component is fetched first and authorization is evaluated against its real owning project (comp.Spec.Owner.ProjectName) instead of the caller-supplied project query parameter.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately:

Restrict component:exec and wirelogs:view grants to trusted operators only. Any holder of such a grant on any project can reach every component in the same namespace.
Where stronger isolation is required, separate sensitive components into their own namespaces, since the flaw does not cross namespace boundaries.

Related advisories

GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327 — the cluster-gateway internal proxy applies no caller authorization, so this API-layer authorization bypass reaches the data-plane Kubernetes API with no compensating control: https://github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo/security/advisories/GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327
GHSA-c5f6-2rm9-2w8g — reported together as part of the same review.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo`	≥ 1.2.0-m.1&&< 1.2.3	1.2.3`go get github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo@v1.2.3`
🐹Go	`github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo`	all versions	1.1.6`go get github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo@v1.1.6`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo to 1.2.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-73841 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The OpenChoreo API server (`openchoreo-api`) authorized requests to its exec and wirelogs endpoints against the project supplied by the caller in the request, rather than against the project that actually owns the target component. The target component was resolved by name only, and the authorization engine decided purely from the caller-supplied resource hierarchy — the component's real owning project was never checked. As a result, an authenticated user who holds a project-scoped exec or log-viewing grant on any single project could run commands in, and read the wirelogs of, com