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HIGH severity

GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf scriban

HIGH

GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) CWE-226 vulnerability in scriban. A fix is available for scriban — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Scriban has an authorization bypass due to stale include cache surviving TemplateContext.Reset()

Also known asCVE-2026-74791
Published
Mar 24, 2026
Updated
Aug 17, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs19th percentile — riskier than 19% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
.NETscriban.NETScriban.Signed

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

TemplateContext.Reset() claims that a TemplateContext can be reused safely on the same thread, but it does not clear CachedTemplates. If an application pools TemplateContext objects and uses an ITemplateLoader that resolves content per request, tenant, or user, a previously authorized include can be served to later renders without calling TemplateLoader.Load() again.

Details

The relevant code path is:

  • TemplateContext.Reset() only clears output, globals, cultures, and source files in src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs lines 877–902.
  • CachedTemplates is initialized once and kept on the context in src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs line 197.
  • include resolves templates through IncludeFunction.Invoke() in src/Scriban/Functions/IncludeFunction.cs lines 29–43.
  • IncludeFunction.Invoke() calls TemplateContext.GetOrCreateTemplate() in src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs lines 1249–1256.
  • If a template path is already present in CachedTemplates, Scriban returns the cached compiled template and does not call TemplateLoader.Load() again.

This becomes a security issue when ITemplateLoader.Load() returns request-dependent content. A first render can prime the cache with an admin-only or tenant-specific template, and later renders on the same reused TemplateContext will receive that stale template even after Reset().


Proof of Concept

Setup

mkdir scriban-poc1
cd scriban-poc1
dotnet new console --framework net8.0
dotnet add package Scriban --version 6.6.0

Program.cs

using Scriban;
using Scriban.Parsing;
using Scriban.Runtime;

var loader = new SwitchingLoader();
var context = new TemplateContext
{
    TemplateLoader = loader,
};

var template = Template.Parse("{{ include 'profile' }}");

loader.Content = "admin-only";
Console.WriteLine("first=" + template.Render(context));

context.Reset();

loader.Content = "guest-view";
Console.WriteLine("second=" + template.Render(context));

sealed class SwitchingLoader : ITemplateLoader
{
    public string Content { get; set; } = string.Empty;

    public string GetPath(TemplateContext context, SourceSpan callerSpan, string templateName) => templateName;

    public string Load(TemplateContext context, SourceSpan callerSpan, string templatePath) => Content;

    public ValueTask<string> LoadAsync(TemplateContext context, SourceSpan callerSpan, string templatePath)
        => new(Content);
}

Run

dotnet run

Actual Output

first=admin-only
second=admin-only

Expected Output

first=admin-only
second=guest-view

The second render should reload the template after Reset(), but it instead reuses the cached compiled template from the previous render.


Impact

This is a cross-render data isolation issue. Any application that reuses TemplateContext objects and uses a request-dependent ITemplateLoader can leak previously authorized template content across requests, users, or tenants.

The issue impacts applications that:

  • Pool or reuse TemplateContext
  • Call Reset() between requests
  • Use include
  • Resolve include content based on request-specific state

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
.NETNuGetscribanall versions7.0.0dotnet add package scriban --version 7.0.0
.NETNuGetScriban.Signedall versions7.0.0dotnet add package Scriban.Signed --version 7.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for scriban, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update scriban to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `TemplateContext.Reset()` claims that a `TemplateContext` can be reused safely on the same thread, but it does not clear `CachedTemplates`. If an application pools `TemplateContext` objects and uses an `ITemplateLoader` that resolves content per request, tenant, or user, a previously authorized include can be served to later renders without calling `TemplateLoader.Load()` again. ## Details The relevant code path is: - `TemplateContext.Reset()` only clears output, globals, cultures, and source files in `src/Scriban/TemplateContext.cs` lines 877–902. - `CachedTemplates` is initial
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf across NuGet dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-x6m9-38vm-2xhf: scriban (High 8.6) | O3 Security