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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-x22w-82jp-8rvf

OpenEXR Out-Of-Memory via Unbounded File Header Values

Also known asCVE-2025-48074
Published
Jul 31, 2025
Updated
Jun 11, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk15th percentile+0.11%
0.00%0.25%0.49%0.74%0.1%0.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍openexr

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window.

The application trusts the value of dataWindow size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value.

This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations.

Details

A concrete example of this issue is present in the function readScanline() in ImfCheckFile.cpp at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the dataWindow min.y and max.y coordinates that can be arbitrarily large.

in.setFrameBuffer (i);

int step = 1;

//
// try reading scanlines. Continue reading scanlines
// even if an exception is encountered
//
for (int y = dw.min.y; y <= dw.max.y; y += step) // <-- THIS LOOP IS EXCESSIVE BECAUSE OF DW.MAX
{
    try
    {
        in.readPixels (y);
    }
    catch (...)
    {
        threw = true;

        //
        // in reduceTime mode, fail immediately - the file is corrupt
        //
        if (reduceTime) { return threw; }
    }
}

Another example occurs in the EnvmapImage::resize function that in turn calls Array2D<T>::resizeEraseUnsafe passing the dataWindow X and Y coordinates and perform a huge allocation.

On some system, the allocator will simply return std::bad_alloc and crash. On other systems such as macOS, the allocator will happily continue with a "small" pre-allocation and allocate further memory whenever it is accessed. This is the case with the EnvmapImage::clear function that is called right after and fills the image RGB values with zeros, allocating tens of Gigabytes.

PoC

NOTE: please download the oom_crash.exr file via the following link:

https://github.com/ShielderSec/poc/tree/main/CVE-2025-48074

  1. Compile the exrcheck binary in a macOS or GNU/Linux machine with ASAN.
  2. Open the oom_crash.exr file with the following command:
exrcheck oom_crash.exr
  1. Notice that exrenvmap/exrcheck crashes with ASAN stack-trace.

Impact

An attacker could cause a denial of service by stalling the application or exhaust memory by stalling the application in a loop which contains a memory leakage.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopenexr3.3.2&&< 3.3.33.3.3

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openexr. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openexr to 3.3.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-x22w-82jp-8rvf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-x22w-82jp-8rvf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-x22w-82jp-8rvf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The OpenEXR file format defines many information about the final image inside of the file header, such as the size of data/display window. The application trusts the value of `dataWindow` size provided in the header of the input file, and performs computations based on this value. This may result in unintended behaviors, such as excessively large number of iterations and/or huge memory allocations. ### Details A concrete example of this issue is present in the function `readScanline()` in `ImfCheckFile.cpp` at line 235, that performs a for-loop using the `dataWindow min.y` and
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-x22w-82jp-8rvf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-x22w-82jp-8rvf across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.