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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m

HIGH

Modoboa has OS Command Injection

Also known asCVE-2026-27602
Published
Mar 25, 2026
Updated
Mar 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk43th percentile+0.53%
0.00%0.36%0.71%1.07%0.1%0.1%0.0%0.6%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍modoboa

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

exec_cmd() in modoboa/lib/sysutils.py always runs subprocess calls with shell=True. Since domain names flow directly into shell command strings without any sanitization, a Reseller or SuperAdmin can include shell metacharacters in a domain name to run arbitrary OS commands on the server.

Details

The root cause is in modoboa/lib/sysutils.py:31:

kwargs["shell"] = True
process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, **kwargs)

When a create a domain is created with DKIM enabled, the domain name gets embedded into a shell command like this:

exec_cmd(f"openssl genrsa -out {dkim_storage_dir}/{domain.name}.pem {key_size}")

If the domain name contains something like $(id>/tmp/proof).example.com, the shell executes the injected command before running openssl.

The same pattern appears in several other places:

  • modoboa/admin/jobs.py:38 — mailbox rename via mv using full_address
  • modoboa/amavis/lib.py:202sa-learn using domain.name
  • modoboa/admin/models/mailbox.py:150doveadm user using full_address
  • modoboa/maillog/graphics.py:105–107rrdtool using domain.name
  • modoboa/webmail/models.py:54–57doveadm move/delete using account.email

PoC

  1. Deploy modoboa <= 2.7.0
  2. Log in as a Reseller or SuperAdmin
  3. Create a new domain named $(id>/tmp/proof).example.com with DKIM enabled
  4. SSH into the server and read /tmp/proof

Something like this will be displayed:

uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

Confirmed on commit b521bcb4f (latest main at time of discovery).

Impact

An attacker with Reseller-level access (or higher) can execute arbitrary OS commands on the mail server — in a typical Modoboa deployment this means running as root. All six identified sinks are reachable through normal application workflows.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPImodoboaall versions2.7.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for modoboa. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update modoboa to 2.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `exec_cmd()` in `modoboa/lib/sysutils.py` always runs subprocess calls with `shell=True`. Since domain names flow directly into shell command strings without any sanitization, a Reseller or SuperAdmin can include shell metacharacters in a domain name to run arbitrary OS commands on the server. ### Details The root cause is in `modoboa/lib/sysutils.py:31`: ```python kwargs["shell"] = True process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, **kwargs) ``` When a create a domain is created with DKIM enabled, the domain name gets embedded into a shell command like this: ```python exec_cmd(f"openssl g
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.