EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
modoboaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
exec_cmd() in modoboa/lib/sysutils.py always runs subprocess calls with shell=True. Since domain names flow directly into shell command strings without any sanitization, a Reseller or SuperAdmin can include shell metacharacters in a domain name to run arbitrary OS commands on the server.
Details
The root cause is in modoboa/lib/sysutils.py:31:
kwargs["shell"] = True
process = subprocess.Popen(cmd, **kwargs)
When a create a domain is created with DKIM enabled, the domain name gets embedded into a shell command like this:
exec_cmd(f"openssl genrsa -out {dkim_storage_dir}/{domain.name}.pem {key_size}")
If the domain name contains something like $(id>/tmp/proof).example.com, the shell executes the injected command before running openssl.
The same pattern appears in several other places:
modoboa/admin/jobs.py:38— mailbox rename viamvusingfull_addressmodoboa/amavis/lib.py:202—sa-learnusingdomain.namemodoboa/admin/models/mailbox.py:150—doveadm userusingfull_addressmodoboa/maillog/graphics.py:105–107—rrdtoolusingdomain.namemodoboa/webmail/models.py:54–57—doveadm move/deleteusingaccount.email
PoC
- Deploy modoboa <= 2.7.0
- Log in as a Reseller or SuperAdmin
- Create a new domain named
$(id>/tmp/proof).example.comwith DKIM enabled - SSH into the server and read
/tmp/proof
Something like this will be displayed:
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Confirmed on commit b521bcb4f (latest main at time of discovery).
Impact
An attacker with Reseller-level access (or higher) can execute arbitrary OS commands on the mail server — in a typical Modoboa deployment this means running as root. All six identified sinks are reachable through normal application workflows.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | modoboa | all versions | 2.7.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for modoboa. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update modoboa to 2.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wwv8-cqpr-vx3m across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.