How severe is GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j?

GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j has a CVSS score of 8.8/10, rated HIGH. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j?

GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j affects the following packages: gitpython (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j?

Update gitpython to 3.1.58 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j was published on August 7, 2026 and was last updated on August 7, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j

HIGH

GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in gitpython. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via split_single_char_options=False short-option token smuggling enables command execution

Published

Aug 7, 2026

Updated

Aug 7, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍gitpython

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The check_unsafe_options guard can be bypassed on every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by combining a single-character kwarg with split_single_char_options=False. The guard's candidate list omits the smuggled option, but transform_kwarg emits a JOINED -n<value> argv token that git parses as --upload-pack=<cmd>, yielding arbitrary command execution at the default allow_unsafe_options=False. This is an incomplete-fix bypass of commit e8d0fbf7 (the fix for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3), which only emits value-derived candidates when split_single_char_options is True.

Root Cause

_option_candidates derives value-token candidates only under if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options: (cmd.py:1048, added by e8d0fbf7). With split_single_char_options=False, _option_candidates([], {"n":"utouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack"}) returns only ['-n'] (not on the denylist), so the guard passes. But transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=False) emits the JOINED token -nutouch <cmd>;git-upload-pack (cmd.py:1631). git clusters value-less short flags then parses -u<cmd> = --upload-pack=<cmd> → command execution. The hardened guard WOULD block the joined token if it saw it — the flaw is it never receives it.

Impact

Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via --upload-pack) at default allow_unsafe_options=False, affecting all guarded methods that forward kwargs. Precondition: the app forwards a user-controlled kwargs dict containing split_single_char_options=False plus a single-char key (same user-dict-forwarding model GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3 accepts).

Proof of Concept

from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(src, dst,
    n="utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack",
    split_single_char_options=False)   # /tmp/ACE created -> ACE

Attack Chain

Entry: app forwards user kwargs to Repo.clone_from(url, path, **kwargs): {split_single_char_options: False, n: 'utouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack'}.
Check: check_unsafe_options(_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe_git_clone_options). Guard: denylist includes --upload-pack/-u. Bypass proof: _option_candidates yields only ['-n'] (value token skipped because split=False); guard never sees -u.
Sink: transform_kwarg emits joined token (cmd.py:1631). argv (observed): ['git','clone','-v','-nutouch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack','--','<src>','<dst>'].
Impact: git clusters -n + -u<cmd> → runs upload-pack command → ACE.

Bypass Evidence

Independently reproduced (gate harness, default allow_unsafe_options=False): the split=False payload created the marker VH05_GATE_ACE (ACE); the clone returned normally (guard bypassed). Control: n='--upload-pack=…' (split default True) → UnsafeOptionError: --upload-pack is not allowed. Fix-commit read: e8d0fbf7 extends candidates only under if len(key)==1 and split_single_char_options: — split=False skips value emission. Also confirmed the earlier clustering-parse fix (commit 56806080) does not cover this because the guard only ever receives ['-n'].

Affected Versions

GitPython <= 3.1.57 (code present verbatim on the latest release tag).

Suggested Fix

Make _option_candidates emit value-derived candidates regardless of split_single_char_options (i.e. also for the joined -n<value> form), OR run check_unsafe_options over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`gitpython`	all versions	3.1.58

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update gitpython to 3.1.58 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wvpp-8hx9-p66j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `check_unsafe_options` guard can be bypassed on every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by combining a single-character kwarg with `split_single_char_options=False`. The guard's candidate list omits the smuggled option, but `transform_kwarg` emits a JOINED `-n<value>` argv token that git parses as `--upload-pack=<cmd>`, yielding arbitrary command execution at the default `allow_unsafe_options=False`. This is an incomplete-fix bypass of commit `e8d0fbf7` (the fix for GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3), which only emits value-derived can

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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