GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm is a low-severity (CVSS 3.1) CWE-324 vulnerability in github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go. A fix is available for github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go — see the affected versions and patch details below.
sigstore-go fails to check signature timestamps against a signing key's validity period
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 376,715 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/sigstore/sigstore-goReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
sigstore-go fails to check signature timestamps against a signing key's validity period for self-managed long-lived keys without certificates.
Impact
To verify a bundle with a self-managed long-lived key, the key needs to be wrapped in an ExpiringKey type that implies expiration semantics:
signatureVerifier, _ := signature.LoadDefaultVerifier(publicKey)
expiredKey := root.NewExpiringKey(signatureVerifier, time.Unix(0, 0), time.Unix(1, 0))
Despite the API contract, the validator does not check the bundle signing time against the validity window. Attackers that obtain expired key materials may be able to sign bundles with those materials that are accepted despite a configured expiry date. This issue only impacts the long-lived signing key workflow, and not standard deployments involving a certificate authority.
Reproduction steps
Start from a sigstore-go checkout:
git clone https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go.git
cd sigstore-go
git checkout 8ca80c47ef03d26ebf174db7c296700b075b2c16
Apply the patch containing the test case and associated materials:
git apply sigstore-go-public-key-validity-test.patch
Run the test:
go test ./pkg/verify -run TestPublicKeyValidityCheckedAgainstSignedTimestamp
On vulnerable code, the test fails because verification succeeds even though the trusted ExpiringKey is not valid at the signed timestamp:
--- FAIL: TestPublicKeyValidityCheckedAgainstSignedTimestamp
signed_entity_test.go:602:
Error: An error is expected but got nil.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go | all versions | 1.2.1go get github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go@v1.2.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go to 1.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
| Product | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Hardened Images | spire1-15-main-1.15.2-0.3.hum1 | RHSA-2026:44162 |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | cosign-main-3.1.2-0.2.hum1 | RHSA-2026:44451 |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | spire1-14-main-1.14.7-0.3.hum1 | RHSA-2026:47889 |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | trivy-main-0.72.0-0.1.3.hum1 | RHSA-2026:47891 |
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.