GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm
LOWGHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm is a low-severity (CVSS 3.1) CWE-324 vulnerability in github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
sigstore-go fails to check signature timestamps against a signing key's validity period
Blast Radius
github.com/sigstore/sigstore-goReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
sigstore-go fails to check signature timestamps against a signing key's validity period for self-managed long-lived keys without certificates.
Impact
To verify a bundle with a self-managed long-lived key, the key needs to be wrapped in an ExpiringKey type that implies expiration semantics:
signatureVerifier, _ := signature.LoadDefaultVerifier(publicKey)
expiredKey := root.NewExpiringKey(signatureVerifier, time.Unix(0, 0), time.Unix(1, 0))
Despite the API contract, the validator does not check the bundle signing time against the validity window. Attackers that obtain expired key materials may be able to sign bundles with those materials that are accepted despite a configured expiry date. This issue only impacts the long-lived signing key workflow, and not standard deployments involving a certificate authority.
Reproduction steps
Start from a sigstore-go checkout:
git clone https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go.git
cd sigstore-go
git checkout 8ca80c47ef03d26ebf174db7c296700b075b2c16
Apply the patch containing the test case and associated materials:
git apply sigstore-go-public-key-validity-test.patch
Run the test:
go test ./pkg/verify -run TestPublicKeyValidityCheckedAgainstSignedTimestamp
On vulnerable code, the test fails because verification succeeds even though the trusted ExpiringKey is not valid at the signed timestamp:
--- FAIL: TestPublicKeyValidityCheckedAgainstSignedTimestamp
signed_entity_test.go:602:
Error: An error is expected but got nil.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go | all versions | 1.2.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/sigstore/sigstore-go to 1.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.