Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
CRITICAL severity

GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 — fission

CRITICALFix: fission/fission#3390

GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. A fix is available for github.com/fission/fission — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Fission Environment CRD PodSpec Injection Leading to Node Escape and Cluster Takeover

Also known asCVE-2026-50545GO-2026-5860
Published
Jun 30, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs42th percentile — riskier than 42% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 380,066 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/fission/fission

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec / spec.builder.podSpec passthrough lacked validation, and MergePodSpec propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods.

Details

Three independent flaws compounded:

  1. Validate gap. pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate checked only container naming conventions, never hostPID/hostIPC/hostNetwork/hostPath/privileged.
  2. UPDATE bypass. The pkg/webhook/environment.go kubebuilder marker registered verbs=create only. A tenant could kubectl apply a clean Environment and then kubectl patch in the dangerous fields — the webhook was never called.
  3. Merge propagation. pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpec unconditionally forwarded HostPID, HostIPC, HostNetwork, Volumes (including hostPath), SecurityContext, and ServiceAccountName into the Deployments generated by poolmgr / newdeploy / buildermgr.

A kubectl apply plus a follow-up kubectl patch caused poolmgr to schedule a privileged pod with a host-root mount within roughly 20 seconds. From that pod the cluster CA private key was readable, allowing the attacker to sign arbitrary kubelet certificates and achieve full cluster takeover.

Impact

environments.fission.io create/update RBAC is escalated to node escape and, via the readable cluster CA key, full cluster takeover.

Fix

Fixed in #3391 (with the companion buildermgr SA-token fix in #3390) and released in v1.24.0. Each enumerated flaw is addressed:

  1. Validate — ValidatePodSpecSafety is called from Environment.Validate for both Runtime.PodSpec and Builder.PodSpec.
  2. UPDATE bypass — the webhook marker is extended to verbs=create;update; chart and envtest manifests are aligned.
  3. Merge propagation — host namespaces, ServiceAccountName, and hostPath volumes are stripped at the merge layer; per-container privileged/allowPrivilegeEscalation and dangerous capabilities are sanitized.

See GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 for the detailed fix — both advisories close to the same commit.

Duplicate handling

This advisory and GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 were reported separately but close to the same code fix. Both are published to acknowledge each reporter's contribution and to keep the public CVE record clear about the multi-layer nature of the issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/fission/fissionall versions1.24.0go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.24.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.24.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the `Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec` / `spec.builder.podSpec` passthrough lacked validation, and `MergePodSpec` propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods. ### Details Three independent flaws compounded: 1. **Validate gap.** `pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate` checked only container naming conventions, never `hostPID`/`hostIPC`/`hostNetwork`/`hostPath`/`privileged`. 2. **UPDATE bypass.** The `pkg/webhook/environment.go` kubebuilder marker registered `verbs=create` only. A tenant coul
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7: fission (Critical 9.9) | O3 Security