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CRITICAL severity

GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7

CRITICALFix: fission/fission#3390

GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Fission Environment CRD PodSpec Injection Leading to Node Escape and Cluster Takeover

Also known asCVE-2026-50545GO-2026-5860
Published
Jun 30, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/fission/fission

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec / spec.builder.podSpec passthrough lacked validation, and MergePodSpec propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods.

Details

Three independent flaws compounded:

  1. Validate gap. pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate checked only container naming conventions, never hostPID/hostIPC/hostNetwork/hostPath/privileged.
  2. UPDATE bypass. The pkg/webhook/environment.go kubebuilder marker registered verbs=create only. A tenant could kubectl apply a clean Environment and then kubectl patch in the dangerous fields — the webhook was never called.
  3. Merge propagation. pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpec unconditionally forwarded HostPID, HostIPC, HostNetwork, Volumes (including hostPath), SecurityContext, and ServiceAccountName into the Deployments generated by poolmgr / newdeploy / buildermgr.

A kubectl apply plus a follow-up kubectl patch caused poolmgr to schedule a privileged pod with a host-root mount within roughly 20 seconds. From that pod the cluster CA private key was readable, allowing the attacker to sign arbitrary kubelet certificates and achieve full cluster takeover.

Impact

environments.fission.io create/update RBAC is escalated to node escape and, via the readable cluster CA key, full cluster takeover.

Fix

Fixed in #3391 (with the companion buildermgr SA-token fix in #3390) and released in v1.24.0. Each enumerated flaw is addressed:

  1. Validate — ValidatePodSpecSafety is called from Environment.Validate for both Runtime.PodSpec and Builder.PodSpec.
  2. UPDATE bypass — the webhook marker is extended to verbs=create;update; chart and envtest manifests are aligned.
  3. Merge propagation — host namespaces, ServiceAccountName, and hostPath volumes are stripped at the merge layer; per-container privileged/allowPrivilegeEscalation and dangerous capabilities are sanitized.

See GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 for the detailed fix — both advisories close to the same commit.

Duplicate handling

This advisory and GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 were reported separately but close to the same code fix. Both are published to acknowledge each reporter's contribution and to keep the public CVE record clear about the multi-layer nature of the issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/fission/fissionall versions1.24.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.24.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the `Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec` / `spec.builder.podSpec` passthrough lacked validation, and `MergePodSpec` propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods. ### Details Three independent flaws compounded: 1. **Validate gap.** `pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validate` checked only container naming conventions, never `hostPID`/`hostIPC`/`hostNetwork`/`hostPath`/`privileged`. 2. **UPDATE bypass.** The `pkg/webhook/environment.go` kubebuilder marker registered `verbs=create` only. A tenant coul
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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