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HIGH severity

Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpecGHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v

HIGHFix: fission/fission#3367

GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. A fix is available for github.com/fission/fission — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asGO-2026-5849
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/fission/fission

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace.

Details

1. Secret materialization. getEnvVarlist in pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go read the Secret named in Spec.Secret using the controller's cluster-wide secrets/get RBAC and emitted each key as a literal EnvVar.Value, copying the plaintext secret content into the connector Deployment's pod template. A subject holding messagequeuetriggers/create but not secrets/get could exfiltrate any Secret in the namespace by pointing an MQT at it.

2. PodSpec injection. Spec.PodSpec was merged into the controller-built connector PodSpec via util.MergePodSpec with no allowlist on which fields could come from the user. An MQT could substitute Containers[].Image (run any image), override Command/Args, inject Env, add VolumeMounts + Volumes, override ServiceAccountName, and set HostNetwork/HostPID/HostIPC — turning messagequeuetriggers/create into effective deployments/create with an arbitrary image and service account.

Impact

A tenant with only messagequeuetriggers.fission.io/create in a namespace could read any Secret in that namespace and run an arbitrary container image under an arbitrary service account, escalating well beyond their intended RBAC.

Fix

Fixed in #3367 and released in v1.24.0.

  • getEnvVarlist now emits EnvVar.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRef so the connector pod resolves values at start time under its own service account. The secret values are never written into the Deployment object and never logged.
  • A new allowlist, MergeAllowedPodSpecFields (pkg/executor/util/merge_allowlist.go), accepts only NodeSelector, Tolerations, Affinity, RuntimeClassName, and per-container Resources. All other user-supplied fields are dropped at the controller layer, and the validating webhook rejects every populated non-allowlisted field with a clear error. The webhook and the merge helper share a single canonical DisallowedPodSpecFields enumeration so they cannot drift.

Behavioural change

MQT authors that previously overrode the connector image, command, args, env, volumes, service account, or host namespaces via Spec.PodSpec will see those fields rejected at admission (or silently dropped if the webhook is disabled). Allowlisted fields flow through unchanged.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/fission/fissionall versions1.24.0go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.24.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.24.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace. ### Details **1. Secret materialization.** `getEnvVarlist` in `pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go` read the Secret named in `Spec.Secret` using the controller's cluster-wide `secrets/get` RBAC and emitted each key as a literal `EnvVar.Value`, copying the plaintext secret content into the connector Deployment's pod template. A subject holding `messagequeuetriggers/create` but **not** `secrets/get` could exfiltrate any Secret in the nam
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager…