Fission: MessageQueueTrigger scaler manager materializes Secret values into Deployment envvars and accepts arbitrary user PodSpecGHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v
HIGHFix: fission/fission#3367GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. A fix is available for github.com/fission/fission — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/fission/fissionReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Fission MessageQueueTrigger (MQT) scaler controller exposed two privilege-escalation primitives to any subject able to create MQTs in a namespace.
Details
1. Secret materialization. getEnvVarlist in pkg/mqtrigger/scalermanager.go read the Secret named in Spec.Secret using the controller's cluster-wide secrets/get RBAC and emitted each key as a literal EnvVar.Value, copying
the plaintext secret content into the connector Deployment's pod template. A subject holding messagequeuetriggers/create but not secrets/get could exfiltrate any Secret in the namespace by pointing an MQT at it.
2. PodSpec injection. Spec.PodSpec was merged into the controller-built connector PodSpec via util.MergePodSpec with no allowlist on which fields could come from the user. An MQT could substitute Containers[].Image (run any
image), override Command/Args, inject Env, add VolumeMounts + Volumes, override ServiceAccountName, and set HostNetwork/HostPID/HostIPC — turning messagequeuetriggers/create into effective deployments/create with an
arbitrary image and service account.
Impact
A tenant with only messagequeuetriggers.fission.io/create in a namespace could read any Secret in that namespace and run an arbitrary container image under an arbitrary service account, escalating well beyond their intended RBAC.
Fix
Fixed in #3367 and released in v1.24.0.
getEnvVarlistnow emitsEnvVar.ValueFrom.SecretKeyRefso the connector pod resolves values at start time under its own service account. The secret values are never written into the Deployment object and never logged.- A new allowlist,
MergeAllowedPodSpecFields(pkg/executor/util/merge_allowlist.go), accepts onlyNodeSelector,Tolerations,Affinity,RuntimeClassName, and per-containerResources. All other user-supplied fields are dropped at the controller layer, and the validating webhook rejects every populated non-allowlisted field with a clear error. The webhook and the merge helper share a single canonicalDisallowedPodSpecFieldsenumeration so they cannot drift.
Behavioural change
MQT authors that previously overrode the connector image, command, args, env, volumes, service account, or host namespaces via Spec.PodSpec will see those fields rejected at admission (or silently dropped if the webhook is disabled).
Allowlisted fields flow through unchanged.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/fission/fission | all versions | 1.24.0go get github.com/fission/fission@v1.24.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.24.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-7m8x-qg2j-4m3v in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.