GHSA-wh2w-39f4-rpv2 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-347 vulnerability in indy-node. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for indy-node — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Hyperledger Indy's update process of a DID does not check who signs the request
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-wh2w-39f4-rpv2 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
indy-nodeReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Name
Updating a DID with a nym transaction will be written to the ledger if neither ROLE or VERKEY are being changed, regardless of sender.
Description
A malicious DID with no particular role can ask an update for another DID (but cannot modify its verkey or role). This is bad because:
- Any DID can write a nym transaction to the ledger (i.e., any DID can spam the ledger with nym transactions).
- Any DID can change any other DID's alias.
- The update transaction modifies the ledger metadata associated with a DID.
Expected vs Observed
We expect that if a DID (with no role) wants to update another DID (not its own or one it is the endorser), then the nodes should refuse the request. We can see that requirements in the Indy default auth_rules in Section "Who is the owner" in the last point of "Endorser using".
We observe that with a normal DID, we can update the field from for a random DID, for example, the one of a TRUSTEE. It creates then a new transaction on the ledger.
Explanation of the attack
We first begin to connect to the pool and open a wallet. Then, we will use a TRUSTEE (but can also be a STEWARD or an ENDORSER) DID V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe6f. We ask the information about V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe6f with a get-nym. We create a new DID V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe1a signed by V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe6f with no role. For the rest of the attack, we will use V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe1a to sign new transactions. We send a ledger nym did=V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe6f extra=hello to see if V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe1a can send an update of a TRUSTEE identity. When we ask information to the ledger about V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe6f, it answers that the from field is V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe1a (to compare with the first get-nym we did with from field = V4SGRU86Z58d6TV7PBUe6f). To see the log of the attack, I modified my indy-cli to print the json request and the json response directly on the terminal. You can find the log file indy.log in this archive.
Implementation notes
NymHandler method update_state, line 62. I think that we need to check if the DID which signs the transaction, owns the DID or is its endorser.
Steps to Reproduce
Environment
Ubuntu 18.04
Docker version 19.03.8
indy-cli
indy-ci Dockerfile is copied in this archive
To install indy-cli, run ./install_indy_cli.sh
Command
Here is the script to create the container, run the attack and remove the container and the image. Find below the command to execute each step separately.
./full_attack.sh
Installation of the environment
Install indy-cli and create an image with tag test from Dockerfile
./install.sh
Exploit
indy-cli proof_of_concept
Uninstallation of the environment
Suppress the container test and remove the image test
./uninstall.sh
Analysis
We are grateful to @alexandredeleze for discovering and responsibly disclosing the issue.
We were previously aware that any DID on the ledger can "update" the state (seqNo + txnTime) if it doesn't change the state data itself. We considered this a minor bug because only the seqNo and txnTime changed. But seeing that this can also affect the "parent" DID means that it has a higher severity.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | indy-node | all versions | 1.12.4pip install --upgrade 'indy-node==1.12.4' |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for indy-node, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update indy-node to 1.12.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-wh2w-39f4-rpv2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-wh2w-39f4-rpv2 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-wh2w-39f4-rpv2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-wh2w-39f4-rpv2 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-wh2w-39f4-rpv2 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.