fzf: Arbitrary command execution via bash arithmetic expansion on unvalidated layout size in fzf-tmux (-l/-u attached value)GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82
HIGHFix: junegunn/fzf@f126ff2GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82 is a high-severity (CVSS 7) OS Command Injection vulnerability in github.com/junegunn/fzf. A fix is available for github.com/junegunn/fzf — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/junegunn/fzfReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
bin/fzf-tmux fails to validate layout size values given in the attached form (e.g. -l50). For -l/-u these values reach bash arithmetic expansion ($(( max - size ))), where an operand like a[$(cmd)] executes cmd as the invoking user during option parsing — before any tmux interaction and even outside tmux. A second sink embeds unvalidated popup geometry (-x/-y/-w/-h/-p) into an unquoted tmux popup ... $opt ... invocation, allowing injection of tmux flags such as -e BASH_ENV=<path> (command execution via non-interactive bash sourcing $BASH_ENV).
Reporter / Credits:
Sai Sreewathsa Kovalluri, Shon Babu and Kannan K (Researchers), Innspark Solutions https://innspark.in/
Details
In bin/fzf-tmux (tag 0.74.4, commit a140afeb), the option parser validates size values with a regex (^[0-9%,]+$ / ^[A-Z]$) only for the separate-argument form (line 82). The attached form is captured unvalidated at line 80:
if [[ ${#arg} -gt 2 ]]; then
size="${arg:2}" # no validation
else
if [[ $1 =~ ^[0-9%,]+$ ]] || [[ $1 =~ ^[A-Z]$ ]]; then # only separate form validated
For -l and -u, swap is non-empty (lines 68/75), so size reaches arithmetic evaluation:
- line 120:
size=$((max - size))(non-percent values) - line 102:
opt="$opt -l $((100 - size))%"(percent, tmux >= 3.2) - line 108:
opt="$opt -p $((100 - size))"(percent, tmux < 3.2)
Bash arithmetic expands array subscripts, so a[$(command)] runs command. Verified end-to-end against the unmodified script (see PoC).
Second sink (same root cause): opt is used unquoted at line 236 (tmux popup -d "$PWD" $opt "bash $argsf") and line 249, so a geometry value containing spaces injects extra tmux flags, e.g. -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/script.
PoC
Verified on 0.74.4 (no tmux or fzf binary needed — a stub fzf on PATH suffices because the sink fires during bash argument parsing):
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-l a[$(id > /tmp/pwn1)]' # line 120 sink (non-percent)
$ bash bin/fzf-tmux '-u a[$(id > /tmp/pwn2)]%' # line 102/108 sink (percent)
$ cat /tmp/pwn1 /tmp/pwn2
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
uid=1001(sb) gid=1001(sb) groups=...
A self-contained reproducer was provided by email (poc-t03-arithmetic.sh). Popup flag-injection variant (tmux >= 3.2): bash bin/fzf-tmux -p '-x0 -e BASH_ENV=/path/to/evil.sh'.
Impact
Local command injection (CWE-78). fzf-tmux argv is commonly assembled by third-party scripts and editor plugins (e.g. fzf-tmux -l "${height}%"); any layout value influenced by less-trusted data (project-local config, wrapper scripts) yields arbitrary command execution as the invoking user. Suggested fixes: apply the regex validation to the attached form, constrain size to [0-9]+ before any $((...)), and build the tmux invocation as an array ("${opt_parts[@]}") instead of unquoted $opt.
Reported privately to the maintainer by email; fixes prepared for the next release.
Exploitability in practice
Impact is high (command execution as the invoking user), but a real attack requires attacker-controlled data to reach the fzf-tmux layout arguments (-l/-u). In normal use these values are set by the user or by trusted, hardcoded configuration, so a vulnerable data flow is uncommon. The issue is local-only, requires the victim to run fzf-tmux with the poisoned value, and bin/fzf-tmux has been superseded by the built-in --tmux/--popup option since 0.53.0.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/junegunn/fzf | all versions | 0.74.5go get github.com/junegunn/fzf@v0.74.5 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/junegunn/fzf, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/junegunn/fzf to 0.74.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-w6x2-f5m4-xw82 in your dependencies?
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