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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4

MEDIUM

GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-307 vulnerability in org.yamcs:yamcs-core. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Yamcs has No Rate Limiting on Authentication Endpoint

Also known asCVE-2026-44596
Published
May 27, 2026
Updated
May 27, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Aug 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs76th percentile — riskier than 76% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
1.23%1.56%1.90%2.23%1.7%1.7%Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 363,908 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
org.yamcs:yamcs-core

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The authentication endpoint POST /auth/token in yamcs-core lacks any form of rate limiting, account lockout, or failed attempt throttling. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can perform unlimited password guessing attempts against any user account.

This missing rate limiting vulnerability (CWE-307) significantly increases the risk of successful brute-force attacks.

Root Cause

File: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/auth/AuthHandler.java

POST /auth/token has no rate limiting, no lockout after failed attempts, and no CAPTCHA. The handler processes unlimited authentication requests without any throttling mechanism:

// AuthHandler.java — handleToken()
// No throttle, no failed attempt counter, no lockout
private void handleToken(HandlerContext ctx) {
    ...
    getSecurityStore().login(token).whenComplete((info, err) -> {
        // Directly attempts authentication with no rate check
    });
}

This is absent by default — the official quickstart and documentation contain no guidance on configuring rate limiting.

Impact

An attacker can make unlimited authentication attempts against any account. This enables efficient brute-force attacks against any account.

Proof of Concept

# 20 attempts — zero rate limiting
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
  curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Attempt $i: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
    -X POST "http://TARGET:8090/auth/token" \
    -d "grant_type=password&username=operator&password=operator12$i"
done
# All return HTTP 401 — no HTTP 429 ever

Confirmed: 20 attempts in 0.07 seconds, no rate limiting enforced.

Fix

Implement DRF-style throttling on /auth/token:

// Track failed attempts per IP
private static final Cache<String, Integer> FAILED_ATTEMPTS =
    CacheBuilder.newBuilder().expireAfterWrite(15, TimeUnit.MINUTES).build();

private static final int MAX_ATTEMPTS = 10;

private void handleToken(HandlerContext ctx) {
    String ip = ctx.getRemoteAddress();
    int attempts = Optional.ofNullable(FAILED_ATTEMPTS.getIfPresent(ip)).orElse(0);
    if (attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
        throw new TooManyRequestsException("Rate limit exceeded");
    }
    // ... existing auth logic
    // On failure: FAILED_ATTEMPTS.put(ip, attempts + 1)
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenorg.yamcs:yamcs-coreall versions5.12.7
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

EDB-52605webappsmultiple

YAMCS yamcs-core 5.12.7 - No Rate Limiting

by Daniel Miranda · May 30, 2026

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.yamcs:yamcs-core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update org.yamcs:yamcs-core to 5.12.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The authentication endpoint `POST /auth/token` in `yamcs-core` lacks any form of rate limiting, account lockout, or failed attempt throttling. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can perform unlimited password guessing attempts against any user account. This missing rate limiting vulnerability (CWE-307) significantly increases the risk of successful brute-force attacks. ### Root Cause **File:** `yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/auth/AuthHandler.java` `POST /auth/token` has no rate limiting, no lockout after failed attempts, and no CAPTCHA. The handler proces
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4: Yamcs has No Rate… | O3 Security