CVE-2026-44596 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-307 vulnerability in org.yamcs:yamcs-core. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for org.yamcs:yamcs-core — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Yamcs: No Rate Limiting on Authentication Endpoint
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44596.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-44596 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 384,534 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
org.yamcs:yamcs-coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The authentication endpoint POST /auth/token in yamcs-core lacks any form of rate limiting, account lockout, or failed attempt throttling. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can perform unlimited password guessing attempts against any user account.
This missing rate limiting vulnerability (CWE-307) significantly increases the risk of successful brute-force attacks.
Root Cause
File: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/auth/AuthHandler.java
POST /auth/token has no rate limiting, no lockout after failed attempts, and no CAPTCHA. The handler processes unlimited authentication requests without any throttling mechanism:
// AuthHandler.java — handleToken()
// No throttle, no failed attempt counter, no lockout
private void handleToken(HandlerContext ctx) {
...
getSecurityStore().login(token).whenComplete((info, err) -> {
// Directly attempts authentication with no rate check
});
}
This is absent by default — the official quickstart and documentation contain no guidance on configuring rate limiting.
Impact
An attacker can make unlimited authentication attempts against any account. This enables efficient brute-force attacks against any account.
Proof of Concept
# 20 attempts — zero rate limiting
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Attempt $i: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://TARGET:8090/auth/token" \
-d "grant_type=password&username=operator&password=operator12$i"
done
# All return HTTP 401 — no HTTP 429 ever
Confirmed: 20 attempts in 0.07 seconds, no rate limiting enforced.
Fix
Implement DRF-style throttling on /auth/token:
// Track failed attempts per IP
private static final Cache<String, Integer> FAILED_ATTEMPTS =
CacheBuilder.newBuilder().expireAfterWrite(15, TimeUnit.MINUTES).build();
private static final int MAX_ATTEMPTS = 10;
private void handleToken(HandlerContext ctx) {
String ip = ctx.getRemoteAddress();
int attempts = Optional.ofNullable(FAILED_ATTEMPTS.getIfPresent(ip)).orElse(0);
if (attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
throw new TooManyRequestsException("Rate limit exceeded");
}
// ... existing auth logic
// On failure: FAILED_ATTEMPTS.put(ip, attempts + 1)
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.yamcs:yamcs-core | all versions | 5.12.7org.yamcs:yamcs-core:5.12.7 |
Affected Products
yamcsspaceapplicationsResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
YAMCS yamcs-core 5.12.7 - No Rate Limiting
by Daniel Miranda · May 30, 2026
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.yamcs:yamcs-core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update org.yamcs:yamcs-core to 5.12.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44596 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-44596 in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.