Froxlor: Authenticated customers can read other customers' allowed sender aliasesGHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8h
MEDIUMGHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8h is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) Information Exposure vulnerability in froxlor/froxlor. A fix is available for froxlor/froxlor — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8h.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
froxlor/froxlorReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An authenticated customer can read other customers' allowed sender aliases from Froxlor's sender-delete confirmation page when mail.enable_allow_sender is enabled. customer_email.php loads allowed_sender by global auto-increment senderid alone, so a customer can enumerate foreign sender alias IDs and make Froxlor disclose those values in the confirmation dialog for the attacker's own mailbox.
Details
The vulnerable read lives in customer_email.php:
$senderid = Request::any('senderid', 0);
...
$sel_stmt = Database::prepare("SELECT `allowed_sender` FROM `" . TABLE_MAIL_SENDER_ALIAS . "` WHERE `id` = :sid");
$sender_data = Database::pexecute_first($sel_stmt, ['sid' => $senderid]);
HTML::askYesNo('email_reallydelete_sender', $filename, [
'id' => $id,
'senderid' => $senderid,
'page' => $page,
'domainid' => $email_domainid,
'action' => $action
], $idna_convert->decode($result['email_full']) . ' -> ' . $sender_data['allowed_sender']);
The query does not scope senderid to the current customer or to the mailbox being edited. mail_sender_aliases.id is a global AUTO_INCREMENT primary key:
CREATE TABLE `mail_sender_aliases` (
`id` int(11) NOT NULL auto_increment,
`email` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
`allowed_sender` varchar(255) NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (`id`)
)
That makes sender alias IDs enumerable. A customer who owns any mailbox with sender-alias management enabled can request the delete-confirmation page for their own mailbox while supplying foreign senderid values. Froxlor then renders the foreign allowed_sender string in the confirmation prompt.
Proof of Concept
Verified against Froxlor 2.3.6 on a fresh test install with mail.enable_allow_sender=1.
- Create two customers,
victimandattacker. - Give each customer one mailbox.
- Add a sender alias for the victim mailbox:
[email protected] -> [email protected]
- Log in as the attacker and request the delete-confirmation page for the attacker's own mailbox while supplying the victim's sender alias ID:
/customer_email.php?page=senders&domainid=4&action=delete&id=2&senderid=1
Observed in the live test instance:
Do you really want to delete the allowed sender [email protected] -> [email protected]?
The attacker-controlled mailbox identifier stayed [email protected], but the disclosed sender alias text came from the victim-owned row identified by senderid=1.
Impact
An authenticated customer can enumerate global sender alias IDs and read other customers' allowed sender values. This is a cross-tenant information disclosure. It does not let the attacker delete the foreign alias because the delete action revalidates ownership.
Recommended Fix
Scope the sender alias lookup to the current customer and mailbox before rendering the confirmation page. The confirmation flow should fetch the sender alias through the same ownership checks used by EmailSender::delete().
Found by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | froxlor/froxlor | all versions | 2.3.7composer require froxlor/froxlor:^2.3.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for froxlor/froxlor, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update froxlor/froxlor to 2.3.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mr9h-45p9-fg8h in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.