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GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g signalk-server

Fix: SignalK/signalk-server#2568

GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g is a CWE-307 vulnerability in signalk-server. A fix is available for signalk-server — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Signal K Server's WebSocket Login Endpoint Lacks Rate Limiting (Credential Brute-Force)

Also known asCVE-2026-41893
Published
May 4, 2026
Updated
May 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 19, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs26th percentile — riskier than 26% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

2other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
signalk-servernpm
3Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

The HTTP login endpoints (POST /login and POST /signalk/v1/auth/login) are protected by express-rate-limit (default: 100 attempts per 10-minute window, configurable via HTTP_RATE_LIMITS). The WebSocket login path — sending {login: {username, password}} messages over an established WebSocket connection — calls app.securityStrategy.login() directly without any rate limiting.

An attacker can bypass HTTP rate limiting entirely by opening a WebSocket connection and attempting unlimited password guesses at the speed bcrypt allows (~20 attempts/sec with 10 salt rounds).

Details

Vulnerable code: src/interfaces/ws.ts, function processLoginRequest (lines 753-780)

The function directly calls app.securityStrategy.login(msg.login.username, msg.login.password) with no throttling or attempt tracking.

Rate-limited HTTP path for comparison: src/tokensecurity.ts lines 609-617 apply loginLimiter middleware to the HTTP login routes at line 637.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Start Signal K server with security enabled
  2. Open a WebSocket connection to ws://server:3000/signalk/v1/stream?subscribe=none
  3. Wait for the hello message
  4. Send login attempts in rapid succession:
    {"requestId": "1", "login": {"username": "admin", "password": "guess1"}}
    {"requestId": "2", "login": {"username": "admin", "password": "guess2"}}
    
  5. Observe that all attempts are processed without any 429 response or throttling
  6. For comparison, send 100+ HTTP POST requests to /signalk/v1/auth/login — the 101st returns 429

A POC script is available that demonstrates both the HTTP rate limiting working correctly and the WebSocket path accepting unlimited attempts.

Impact

  • Credential brute-forcing via the WebSocket protocol at ~20 attempts/sec (bcrypt-limited)
  • Complete bypass of the HTTP rate limiting defense
  • A single WebSocket connection is sufficient for unlimited attempts
  • With multiple parallel connections, throughput multiplies
  • A 10,000-word dictionary attack completes in ~8 minutes over a single connection

Signal K servers are commonly deployed on boat networks where they may be accessible to other devices on the same LAN.

CWE

CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts

Suggested Fix

Track failed login attempts per remote IP in a shared store (or reuse the existing express-rate-limit store) that is checked in both the HTTP login middleware and the processLoginRequest WebSocket handler.

Context

Found while building an open source maritime security scanner. Verified on v2.24.0 (current master).

Discovered by Mark Curphey

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmsignalk-serverall versions2.25.0npm install signalk-server@2.25.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for signalk-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update signalk-server to 2.25.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The HTTP login endpoints (`POST /login` and `POST /signalk/v1/auth/login`) are protected by `express-rate-limit` (default: 100 attempts per 10-minute window, configurable via `HTTP_RATE_LIMITS`). The WebSocket login path — sending `{login: {username, password}}` messages over an established WebSocket connection — calls `app.securityStrategy.login()` directly without any rate limiting. An attacker can bypass HTTP rate limiting entirely by opening a WebSocket connection and attempting unlimited password guesses at the speed bcrypt allows (~20 attempts/sec with 10 salt rounds). ## D
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-vmfm-ch9h-5c7g: signalk-server | O3 Security