GHSA-vjhc-cf4p-72q4 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.7) CWE-441 vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-vjhc-cf4p-72q4 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Fission: Cross-namespace Environment reference in Package allows build-time command execution and SA token exfiltration
Real-World Exposure
github.com/fission/fissionReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Fission's buildermgr controller processed Package CRDs without verifying that Package.spec.environment.namespace matched Package.metadata.namespace.
Details
An attacker with packages.fission.io/create in their own namespace could set spec.environment.namespace to any other tenant's namespace. The controller then used its high-privilege service account to fetch the Environment
cross-namespace and dispatch the build command into the victim namespace's builder pod.
The build command's stdout is written verbatim into Package.status.buildlog. By running malicious code through an npm preinstall lifecycle hook (or any equivalent build step), the attacker could read the victim namespace's
fission-builder Bearer token from inside that builder pod and surface it through the build log — then use the leaked token to read every Secret and ConfigMap in the victim namespace.
Impact
Cross-tenant compromise: a package author in one namespace could execute code inside another tenant's builder pod and exfiltrate that namespace's fission-builder service-account token, giving namespace-wide secret and configmap read in
the victim namespace.
Fix
Fixed in #3379 and released in v1.24.0. Two checks in series:
- Admission webhook (
pkg/webhook/package.go::Validate) rejectsPackage.spec.environment.namespace != Package.metadata.namespace. An empty namespace is still accepted; the controllers default it to the package's own namespace. - Controller belt-and-braces: the same check is repeated in
pkg/buildermgr/pkgwatcher.go::buildandpkg/buildermgr/common.go::buildPackagebefore the cross-namespaceEnvironments(...).Getcall, so a stale Package CR or a webhook-bypass cluster (failurePolicy=Ignore) cannot exploit the primitive either.
Behavioural change
Packages that explicitly set spec.environment.namespace to a different namespace are now rejected at admission. Empty-string remains accepted (resolves to the package's own namespace, the same as the prior implicit behaviour).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/fission/fission | all versions | 1.24.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.24.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-vjhc-cf4p-72q4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-vjhc-cf4p-72q4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-vjhc-cf4p-72q4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-vjhc-cf4p-72q4 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-vjhc-cf4p-72q4 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.