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GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm — gogs

Fix: gogs/gogs#8175

GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm is a CWE-88 vulnerability in gogs.io/gogs. A fix is available for gogs.io/gogs — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gogs: Release tag option injection in release deletion

Also known asCVE-2026-26194GO-2026-4617
Published
Mar 5, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 26, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs42th percentile — riskier than 42% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹gogs.io/gogs

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

There is a security issue in Gogs where deleting a release can fail if a user-controlled tag name is passed to Git without the right separator, allowing Git option injection and therefore interfering with the process.

Affected Component

  • internal/database/release.go process.ExecDir(..., "git", "tag", "-d", rel.TagName)

Details

rel.TagName is used as a CLI argument to git tag -d without -- or --end-of-options. If the tag name begins with -, Git parses it as a flag.

The prior mitigation is incomplete. There is path sanitization in place during creation:

  • internal/database/release.go r.TagName = strings.TrimLeft(r.TagName, "-")

But it only covers one creation path and does not reliably protect tag deletions, such as tags added through git push or ref updates.

Exploit Conditions

  1. An attacker can add a tag name that starts with a dash into the repository.
  2. A user with permission to delete releases triggers it through the web UI or API.

Recommended Fix

  1. Add end-of-options in release deletion:
    • git tag -d -- <tagName>
  2. It is better to use the safe git-module deletion helper since it handles options properly.
  3. All Git commands should be audited for user input, ensuring that the end-of-options separator is always used.

Impact

  • Option injection into git tag -d
  • Tag/release deletion can fail or behave unexpectedly
  • Operational denial of service in release cleanup workflows
  • Potential release metadata inconsistency

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogogs.io/gogsall versions0.14.2go get gogs.io/gogs@v0.14.2

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
gogsgogs
< 0.14.2
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gogs.io/gogs, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary There is a security issue in Gogs where deleting a release can fail if a user-controlled tag name is passed to Git without the right separator, allowing Git option injection and therefore interfering with the process. ### Affected Component - internal/database/release.go `process.ExecDir(..., "git", "tag", "-d", rel.TagName)` ### Details `rel.TagName` is used as a CLI argument to `git tag -d` without `--` or `--end-of-options`. If the tag name begins with `-`, Git parses it as a flag. The prior mitigation is incomplete. There is path sanitization in place during c
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm: gogs DoS | O3 Security