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📦 npm

GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223

MEDIUM

Hono vulnerable to Prototype Pollution possible through __proto__ key allowed in parseBody({ dot: true })

Published
Mar 11, 2026
Updated
Mar 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

hononpm
47.6Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

When using parseBody({ dot: true }) in HonoRequest, specially crafted form field names such as __proto__.x could create objects containing a __proto__ property.

If the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns, this may lead to prototype pollution in the target object.

Details

The parseBody({ dot: true }) feature supports dot notation to construct nested objects from form field names.

In previous versions, the __proto__ path segment was not filtered. As a result, specially crafted keys such as __proto__.x could produce objects containing __proto__ properties.

While this behavior does not directly modify Object.prototype within Hono itself, it may become exploitable if the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns.

Impact

Applications that merge parsed form data into regular objects using unsafe patterns (for example recursive deep merge utilities) may become vulnerable to prototype pollution.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmhonoall versions4.12.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for hono. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update hono to 4.12.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary When using `parseBody({ dot: true })` in HonoRequest, specially crafted form field names such as `__proto__.x` could create objects containing a `__proto__` property. If the parsed result is later merged into regular JavaScript objects using unsafe merge patterns, this may lead to prototype pollution in the target object. ## Details The `parseBody({ dot: true })` feature supports dot notation to construct nested objects from form field names. In previous versions, the `__proto__` path segment was not filtered. As a result, specially crafted keys such as `__proto__.x` could prod
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-v8w9-8mx6-g223 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.