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AVideo Weak PRNG Activation Code Authentication BypassGHSA-v65f-hc7x-wj62

GHSA-v65f-hc7x-wj62 is a Insufficient Random Values vulnerability. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.

Published
Updated
Affected
32 versions
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-v65f-hc7x-wj62.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.03%0.36%0.70%1.03%0.5%0.5%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Description

AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator when creating account activation / login pairing codes. getRandomCode() in objects/functions.php derives the code entirely from uniqid() (sprintf('%08x%05x', seconds, microseconds)) with a single non-CSPRNG rand() character used only as padding, reducing the code space to roughly 36 x 10^6 (~2^25) values for a known generation second. Because plugin/API/set.json.php?APIName=login_code can be called without authentication, it also serves as an oracle for the server's exact microtime. An unauthenticated remote attacker who guesses a valid, unexpired code (codes expire after 10 minutes) can redeem it at plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=login_code to obtain the target account's email address and a User::getUserHash(users_id, '+1 year') value, a credential accepted in place of the account password for one year, resulting in account takeover. No patched version is available.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Vulnerability

  1. Detect

    Identify every host running the affected component and compare the installed build against the fixed version below — for source-built or distro-packaged software the version string, not a lockfile, is the source of truth (`dpkg -l`, `rpm -q`, or the binary's own `--version`).

  2. Remediation status

    No fixed release is recorded for GHSA-v65f-hc7x-wj62 yet. Track the upstream advisory, and apply the exposure-reduction steps below in the meantime.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator when creating account activation / login pairing codes. getRandomCode() in objects/functions.php derives the code entirely from uniqid() (sprintf('%08x%05x', seconds, microseconds)) with a single non-CSPRNG rand() character used only as padding, reducing the code space to roughly 36 x 10^6 (~2^25) values for a known generation second. Because plugin/API/set.json.php?APIName=login_code can be called without authentication, it also serves as an oracle for the server's exact
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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AVideo Weak PRNG Activation Code Authentication Bypass