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CRITICAL severity

GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92

CRITICALFix: fission/fission#3391

GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in github.com/fission/fission. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Fission Container Executor Function PodSpec Injection Leading to Node Escape

Also known asCVE-2026-50563GO-2026-5858
Published
Jun 30, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/fission/fission

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Fission's Container Executor path lets a tenant supply Function.spec.podspec directly; the executor merges it into the executor-built podspec and creates a Deployment whose pods run the user's container image.

Details

Two flaws compounded:

  1. pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::FunctionSpec.Validate only checked that spec.PodSpec != nil when executorType: container; it did not inspect the content of spec.PodSpec.
  2. pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpec unconditionally forwarded hostPID, hostNetwork, hostIPC, hostPath volumes, serviceAccountName, and container privileged into the Deployment spec via the container-executor sink (pkg/executor/executortype/container/deployment.go::getDeploymentSpec).

A tenant with only functions.fission.io/create could deploy a Function with a crafted podspec that mounted the host root filesystem and shared host namespaces. The executor — running under its high-privilege SA, which holds deployments/create on the function namespace — created that Deployment on the tenant's behalf, turning Function-create into effective deployments/create with arbitrary pod-security configuration.

This is the Function-CRD sibling of GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 / GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7, with a lower attack threshold: regular function developers typically hold functions/create but not environments/create.

Impact

A tenant with only functions.fission.io/create is escalated to node escape via a privileged, host-namespace pod scheduled by the executor.

Fix

Fixed in #3391 and released in v1.24.0.

  • FunctionSpec.Validate now calls ValidatePodSpecSafety("Function.spec.podspec", spec.PodSpec) after the existing spec.PodSpec == nil check.
  • The Function validating webhook is already registered on verbs=create;update, so it picks up the new validation with no marker change.
  • The same merge-layer strip and per-container sanitize used for the Environment path applies here, since the container-executor sink calls util.MergePodSpec.

See GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 for the detailed fix.

Behavioural change

Functions whose spec.podspec sets host namespaces, hostPath volumes, container privileged/allowPrivilegeEscalation, dangerous Linux capabilities, or a serviceAccountName override are now rejected at admission. Legitimate container-executor functions that set image, command, args, env, resources, nodeSelector, tolerations, affinity, non-hostPath volumes, or volumeMounts are unaffected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/fission/fissionall versions1.24.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/fission/fission. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/fission/fission to 1.24.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-v455-mv2v-5g92. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Fission's Container Executor path lets a tenant supply `Function.spec.podspec` directly; the executor merges it into the executor-built podspec and creates a Deployment whose pods run the user's container image. ### Details Two flaws compounded: 1. `pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::FunctionSpec.Validate` only checked that `spec.PodSpec != nil` when `executorType: container`; it did not inspect the content of `spec.PodSpec`. 2. `pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpec` unconditionally forwarded `hostPID`, `hostNetwork`, `hostIPC`, hostPath volumes, `serviceAccountName`, and cont
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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