GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj
GitPython unsafe clone option gate bypass through joined short options
Blast Radius
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Description
GitPython version 3.1.50 blocks unsafe git clone options such as --upload-pack, -u, --config, and -c unless callers explicitly pass allow_unsafe_options=True. However, the default unsafe-option gate does not recognize joined short-option forms such as -u/path/to/helper.
Git itself accepts -u<upload-pack> as the short form of --upload-pack=<upload-pack>. As a result, Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=["-u<helper>"], allow_unsafe_options=False) can execute the helper command even though the equivalent long option is blocked.
Affected package:
- Ecosystem: PyPI
- Package:
GitPython - Confirmed affected version:
3.1.50 - Repository:
gitpython-developers/GitPython - Current PyPI version during triage:
3.1.50
Relevant behavior:
Repo.unsafe_git_clone_optionscorrectly lists--upload-pack,-u,--config, and-cas unsafe clone options.Repo._clone()splitsmulti_optionswithshlex.split(" ".join(multi_options))and then callsGit.check_unsafe_options(...)._canonicalize_option_name("-u/path/to/helper")returns a string beginning withu..., not the canonical short optionu, so it does not match the blocked-uentry.- Git accepts the same joined short option as
--upload-pack=<helper>and executes the helper during clone.
Preconditions:
An application must pass attacker-influenced clone options into Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=...) while relying on GitPython's default unsafe-option gate to block command-executing options.
The local PoC uses only a local bare Git repository and a local helper script. It does not contact any third-party service.
Local reproduction:
The PoC creates a disposable bare Git repository, a helper script, and a sentinel file path. It first confirms that the long --upload-pack=<helper> form is blocked by GitPython. It then calls Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=["-u<helper>"], allow_unsafe_options=False).
Observed sanitized output:
gitpython_version=3.1.50
git_version=git version 2.53.0.windows.1
tmp_dir=<tmp>
long_upload_pack_gate=BLOCKED:UnsafeOptionError
joined_short_upload_pack_gate=ALLOWED
clone_result=EXPECTED_EXCEPTION:GitCommandError
sentinel_exists=True
sentinel_text=GITPYTHON_UNSAFE_OPTION_BYPASS
The clone fails because the helper exits nonzero, but the sentinel file proves that Git executed the helper despite allow_unsafe_options=False.
Impact:
An attacker who controls multi_options can bypass GitPython's default allow_unsafe_options=False protection and execute a local command via Git's --upload-pack / -u clone option. This is a residual bypass of an explicit GitPython security boundary, not merely a case where a caller opted into unsafe behavior.
Duplicate / related advisory checks:
- OSV query for
PyPI/GitPythonversion3.1.50returned no vulnerabilities. - The repository's public advisories include related unsafe Git option issues, including
GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485/CVE-2026-42284andGHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4/CVE-2026-42215. Their public affected ranges are marked as fixed before 3.1.50. GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485describes validatingmulti_optionsbeforeshlex.split(...). GitPython 3.1.50 now validates after splitting, but the joined short option-u<value>still bypasses because the validator canonicalizes it tou<value>rather thanu.GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4describes unsafe underscored kwargs such asupload_pack=.... The current PoC usesmulti_options=["-u<helper>"]against 3.1.50 and does not depend on underscored kwargs.- GitHub issue search for
upload-pack unsafe optionsfound historical related items, including CVE-2022-24439 and the earlier unsafe-options gate work, but no public issue describing this current joined-short-option residual bypass in 3.1.50. - GitHub issue search for
multi_options unsafefound PR #2130, which fixed splitting ofmulti_optionsbefore checking. The current issue remains after that split because-u<value>is treated as option nameu<value>, not blocked short optionu. - GitHub issue searches for
u<upload-pack> unsafeand-cfooreturned no results.
Suggested remediation:
When checking unsafe Git options, parse joined short options that take values. For clone, -uVALUE and -cKEY=VALUE should be canonicalized to u and c respectively before comparing against the unsafe option set.
A safer approach is to maintain command-specific metadata for unsafe short options and recognize the bare option, split form, joined form, and long --option=<value> / --option <value> forms.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | gitpython | ≥ 3.1.50&&< 3.1.51 | 3.1.51 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update gitpython to 3.1.51 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.