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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj

GitPython unsafe clone option gate bypass through joined short options

Published
Jul 21, 2026
Updated
Jul 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍gitpython

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

GitPython version 3.1.50 blocks unsafe git clone options such as --upload-pack, -u, --config, and -c unless callers explicitly pass allow_unsafe_options=True. However, the default unsafe-option gate does not recognize joined short-option forms such as -u/path/to/helper.

Git itself accepts -u<upload-pack> as the short form of --upload-pack=<upload-pack>. As a result, Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=["-u<helper>"], allow_unsafe_options=False) can execute the helper command even though the equivalent long option is blocked.

Affected package:

  • Ecosystem: PyPI
  • Package: GitPython
  • Confirmed affected version: 3.1.50
  • Repository: gitpython-developers/GitPython
  • Current PyPI version during triage: 3.1.50

Relevant behavior:

  • Repo.unsafe_git_clone_options correctly lists --upload-pack, -u, --config, and -c as unsafe clone options.
  • Repo._clone() splits multi_options with shlex.split(" ".join(multi_options)) and then calls Git.check_unsafe_options(...).
  • _canonicalize_option_name("-u/path/to/helper") returns a string beginning with u..., not the canonical short option u, so it does not match the blocked -u entry.
  • Git accepts the same joined short option as --upload-pack=<helper> and executes the helper during clone.

Preconditions:

An application must pass attacker-influenced clone options into Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=...) while relying on GitPython's default unsafe-option gate to block command-executing options.

The local PoC uses only a local bare Git repository and a local helper script. It does not contact any third-party service.

Local reproduction:

The PoC creates a disposable bare Git repository, a helper script, and a sentinel file path. It first confirms that the long --upload-pack=<helper> form is blocked by GitPython. It then calls Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=["-u<helper>"], allow_unsafe_options=False).

Observed sanitized output:

gitpython_version=3.1.50
git_version=git version 2.53.0.windows.1
tmp_dir=<tmp>
long_upload_pack_gate=BLOCKED:UnsafeOptionError
joined_short_upload_pack_gate=ALLOWED
clone_result=EXPECTED_EXCEPTION:GitCommandError
sentinel_exists=True
sentinel_text=GITPYTHON_UNSAFE_OPTION_BYPASS

The clone fails because the helper exits nonzero, but the sentinel file proves that Git executed the helper despite allow_unsafe_options=False.

Impact:

An attacker who controls multi_options can bypass GitPython's default allow_unsafe_options=False protection and execute a local command via Git's --upload-pack / -u clone option. This is a residual bypass of an explicit GitPython security boundary, not merely a case where a caller opted into unsafe behavior.

Duplicate / related advisory checks:

  • OSV query for PyPI/GitPython version 3.1.50 returned no vulnerabilities.
  • The repository's public advisories include related unsafe Git option issues, including GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485 / CVE-2026-42284 and GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4 / CVE-2026-42215. Their public affected ranges are marked as fixed before 3.1.50.
  • GHSA-x2qx-6953-8485 describes validating multi_options before shlex.split(...). GitPython 3.1.50 now validates after splitting, but the joined short option -u<value> still bypasses because the validator canonicalizes it to u<value> rather than u.
  • GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4 describes unsafe underscored kwargs such as upload_pack=.... The current PoC uses multi_options=["-u<helper>"] against 3.1.50 and does not depend on underscored kwargs.
  • GitHub issue search for upload-pack unsafe options found historical related items, including CVE-2022-24439 and the earlier unsafe-options gate work, but no public issue describing this current joined-short-option residual bypass in 3.1.50.
  • GitHub issue search for multi_options unsafe found PR #2130, which fixed splitting of multi_options before checking. The current issue remains after that split because -u<value> is treated as option name u<value>, not blocked short option u.
  • GitHub issue searches for u<upload-pack> unsafe and -cfoo returned no results.

Suggested remediation:

When checking unsafe Git options, parse joined short options that take values. For clone, -uVALUE and -cKEY=VALUE should be canonicalized to u and c respectively before comparing against the unsafe option set.

A safer approach is to maintain command-specific metadata for unsafe short options and recognize the bare option, split form, joined form, and long --option=<value> / --option <value> forms.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIgitpython3.1.50&&< 3.1.513.1.51

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gitpython. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update gitpython to 3.1.51 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

`GitPython` version `3.1.50` blocks unsafe `git clone` options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` unless callers explicitly pass `allow_unsafe_options=True`. However, the default unsafe-option gate does not recognize joined short-option forms such as `-u/path/to/helper`. Git itself accepts `-u<upload-pack>` as the short form of `--upload-pack=<upload-pack>`. As a result, `Repo.clone_from(..., multi_options=["-u<helper>"], allow_unsafe_options=False)` can execute the helper command even though the equivalent long option is blocked. Affected package: - Ecosystem: PyPI - Packa
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-v396-v7q4-x2qj across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.