EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
vllmReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the load_from_url_async method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.
Affected Component
- File:
vllm/connections.py - Function:
load_from_url_async
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The SSRF fix uses urllib3.util.parse_url() to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, load_from_url_async uses aiohttp for making the actual HTTP requests, and aiohttp internally uses the yarl library for URL parsing.
These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (\) differently:
| Parser | Input URL | Parsed Host | Parsed Path | Behavior |
|---|---|---|---|---|
urllib3.parse_url() | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | httpbin.org | /%[email protected]/ | URL-encodes \ as %5C, treats \@evil.com/ as part of the path |
yarl (via aiohttp) | https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/ | evil.com | / | Treats \ as part of userinfo (user: httpbin.org\), the @ acts as the userinfo/host separator |
Attack Scenario
# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"
# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org" ✅ Passes validation
# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
# Request actually goes to evil.com! ❌ Bypass!
Why This Happens
- yarl: Interprets
httpbin.org\as the userinfo component, and@as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed asuser=httpbin.org\,host=evil.com,path=/ - urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as
%5C, so\@evil.com/becomes/%[email protected]/which is treated as part of the path, leavinghost=httpbin.org
This inconsistency allows an attacker to:
- Bypass the hostname allowlist check
- Access arbitrary internal/external services
- Perform full SSRF attacks
Fixes
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | vllm | ≥ 0.15.1&&< 0.17.0 | 0.17.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vllm. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update vllm to 0.17.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-v359-jj2v-j536 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.