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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-25960 — vllm

HIGHFix: vllm-project/vllm@6f3b204

CVE-2026-25960 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in vllm. A fix is available for vllm — see the affected versions and patch details below.

SSRF Protection Bypass in vLLM

Also known asGHSA-v359-jj2v-j536PYSEC-2026-3411
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-25960.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.04%
Lower risk than most CVEs49th percentile — riskier than 49% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.41%0.81%1.22%0.0%0.6%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍vllm

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the load_from_url_async method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client.

Affected Component

  • File: vllm/connections.py
  • Function: load_from_url_async

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

The SSRF fix uses urllib3.util.parse_url() to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, load_from_url_async uses aiohttp for making the actual HTTP requests, and aiohttp internally uses the yarl library for URL parsing.

These two URL parsers handle backslash characters (\) differently:

ParserInput URLParsed HostParsed PathBehavior
urllib3.parse_url()https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/httpbin.org/%[email protected]/URL-encodes \ as %5C, treats \@evil.com/ as part of the path
yarl (via aiohttp)https://httpbin.org\@evil.com/evil.com/Treats \ as part of userinfo (user: httpbin.org\), the @ acts as the userinfo/host separator

Attack Scenario

# Attacker provides this URL
malicious_url = "https://httpbin.org\\@evil.com/"

# 1. Validation layer (urllib3.parse_url)
parsed = urllib3.util.parse_url(malicious_url)
# parsed.host == "httpbin.org"  ✅ Passes validation

# 2. Actual request (aiohttp with yarl)
async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
    async with session.get(malicious_url) as response:
        # Request actually goes to evil.com!  ❌ Bypass!

Why This Happens

  1. yarl: Interprets httpbin.org\ as the userinfo component, and @ as the userinfo/host separator, so the URL is parsed as user=httpbin.org\, host=evil.com, path=/
  2. urllib3: URL-encodes the backslash as %5C, so \@evil.com/ becomes /%[email protected]/ which is treated as part of the path, leaving host=httpbin.org

This inconsistency allows an attacker to:

  • Bypass the hostname allowlist check
  • Access arbitrary internal/external services
  • Perform full SSRF attacks

Fixes

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIvllm≥ 0.15.1&&< 0.17.00.17.0pip install --upgrade 'vllm==0.17.0'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
vllmvllm
≥ 0.15.1 && < 0.17.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vllm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update vllm to 0.17.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-25960 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

This is an IMPORTANT vulnerability. The vLLM component, as used in Red Hat AI Inference Server and Red Hat OpenShift AI, is affected by a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass. This flaw allows an attacker to circumvent existing SSRF safeguards due to inconsistent URL parsing between the validation…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-25960 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25rhoai/odh-vllm-gaudi-rhel9:1780069069RHSA-2026:24977
Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25rhoai/odh-vllm-cuda-rhel9:1783998774RHSA-2026:42644
Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25rhoai/odh-vllm-cpu-rhel9:1792018436RHSA-2026:87410

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The SSRF protection fix for https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-qh4c-xf7m-gxfc can be bypassed in the `load_from_url_async` method due to inconsistent URL parsing behavior between the validation layer and the actual HTTP client. ## Affected Component - **File**: `vllm/connections.py` - **Function**: `load_from_url_async` ## Vulnerability Details ### Root Cause The SSRF [fix](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/32746) uses `urllib3.util.parse_url()` to validate and extract the hostname from user-provided URLs. However, `load_from_url_async` uses
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-25960: vllm SSRF — Fixed in 0.17.0