How severe is GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67?

GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 has a CVSS score of 5.5/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67?

GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 affects the following packages: motioneye (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67?

Update motioneye to 0.44.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for motioneye. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67?

GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 is classified as Information Exposure (CWE-200), CWE-522 (CWE-522), CWE-732 (CWE-732). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 was published on June 22, 2026 and was last updated on July 13, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67

MEDIUM

GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.5) Information Exposure vulnerability in motioneye. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

motionEye's World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash

Also known asCVE-2026-32315PYSEC-2026-2666

Published

Jun 22, 2026

Updated

Jul 13, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍motioneye

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye

Summary

motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf with 644 permissions (-rw-r--r--), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.

Affected Versions

motionEye <= 0.43.1b4
Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies 0600 mode to motion.conf and camera-*.conf files)

Vulnerability Details

World-Readable Configuration File (CWE-732)

When motionEye writes its configuration, the file /etc/motioneye/motion.conf is created with 644 permissions regardless of the installation method. This file contains the admin password hash in the @admin_password field:

# @admin_username admin
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Any local user can read this hash without elevated privileges:

$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Additionally, per-camera configuration files (camera-*.conf) are also created with the same 644 permissions, potentially exposing camera-specific credentials and settings.

Impact

The exposed admin password hash enables several attack paths:

Offline password cracking: The SHA1 hash can be cracked to recover the plaintext admin password
Authentication bypass: When combined with the signature authentication weakness (see GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3), the hash can be used directly to forge authenticated admin API requests
Full system compromise: When further chained with CVE-2025-60787 (OS command injection), a local unprivileged user can escalate to the Motion daemon user (often root)

Proof of Concept

The following demonstrates that an unprivileged user can read the admin password hash from the config file and verify it matches the admin's password:

# Verify the file permissions
$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

# Read the hash as an unprivileged user
$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

# Verify the hash matches the admin password (SHA1)
$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Verified Output

The following output was captured on a fresh motionEye v0.43.1b4 installation (official motioneye_init method, admin password set to testpassword123):

$ ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
-rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 Mar 11 15:42 /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

$ sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf | grep admin_password
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

$ sudo -u testuser python3 -c "import hashlib; print(hashlib.sha1(b'testpassword123').hexdigest())"
c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

The hash extracted by the unprivileged testuser matches the SHA1 of the admin password, confirming full credential exposure.

Reproduction Steps

This vulnerability has been tested and confirmed with both installation methods described in the official motionEye documentation.

Method 1: Manual Installation

Install motionEye on a Linux system:

sudo pip install motioneye
mkdir -p /etc/motioneye /var/log/motioneye /var/lib/motioneye /run/motioneye
cp /usr/local/lib/python3.12/dist-packages/motioneye/extra/motioneye.conf.sample /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf
sudo meyectl startserver -c /etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf

Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765

Verify the config file is world-readable:

ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf

As an unprivileged user, read the hash:

sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Method 2: Official `motioneye_init` Installation

Install motionEye using the official init script:
```
sudo pip install motioneye
sudo motioneye_init
```
The motioneye_init script automatically creates the required directories, installs the systemd service, and starts motionEye. Set an admin password via the web UI at http://localhost:8765
Verify the config file is still world-readable:
```
ls -la /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# -rw-r--r-- 1 motion motion 255 ... /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
```
Note that while the ownership changes to motion:motion (instead of root:root in the manual method), the permissions remain 644, meaning any local user can still read the file.

Confirm as an unprivileged user:

sudo -u testuser cat /etc/motioneye/motion.conf
# @admin_password c18006fc138809314751cd1991f1e0b820fabd37

Both installation methods produce the same vulnerable state, confirming this is the default behavior of the software and not a user misconfiguration.

Related Vulnerabilities

GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3: Password hash accepted as API signing key (CWE-836), which allows the hash exposed by this vulnerability to be used for forging authenticated admin API requests
CVE-2025-60787: OS command injection via image_file_name, which requires admin authentication. When chained with both this vulnerability and GHSA-45h7-499j-7ww3, enables local privilege escalation to root

Suggested Remediation

Fix file permissions: Create motion.conf and camera-*.conf with 600 permissions (-rw-------), readable only by the motionEye service user (addressed in motionEye 0.44.0b1)

Timeline

2026-03-11: Vulnerability discovered during security research
2026-03-11: Vendor notified via GitHub Security Advisory
2026-03-12: Vendor acknowledged, confirmed fix in motionEye 0.44.0b1

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`motioneye`	all versions	0.44.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for motioneye. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update motioneye to 0.44.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rhgp-6wq6-9j67. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

# Security Advisory: World-Readable Configuration File Exposes Admin Password Hash in motionEye ## Summary motionEye v0.43.1 and prior versions create the configuration file `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf` with `644` permissions (`-rw-r--r--`), making it readable by any local user on the system. This file contains sensitive data including the admin password hash, which can be leveraged by other vulnerabilities to escalate privileges. ## Affected Versions - motionEye <= 0.43.1b4 - Fixed in motionEye 0.44.0b1 (applies `0600` mode to `motion.conf` and `camera-*.conf` files) ## Vulnerability Det

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