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GHSA-rf6x-r45m-xv3w

Langflow is Missing Ownership Verification in API Key Deletion (IDOR)

Also known asCVE-2026-33053PYSEC-2026-78
Published
Mar 18, 2026
Updated
Jun 6, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk31th percentile+0.33%
0.00%0.30%0.59%0.89%0.0%0.0%0.1%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍langflow

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Detection Method: Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan

AttributeValue
Locationsrc/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/api_key.py:44-53
Practical ExploitabilityHigh
Developer Approver[email protected]

Description

The delete_api_key_route() endpoint accepts an api_key_id path parameter and deletes it with only a generic authentication check (get_current_active_user dependency). However, the delete_api_key() CRUD function does NOT verify that the API key belongs to the current user before deletion.

Affected Code

@router.delete("/{api_key_id}", dependencies=[Depends(auth_utils.get_current_active_user)])
async def delete_api_key_route(
    api_key_id: UUID,
    db: DbSession,
):
    try:
        await delete_api_key(db, api_key_id)
    except Exception as e:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e)) from e
    return {"detail": "API Key deleted"}

Evidence

In crud.py lines 44-49, delete_api_key() retrieves the API key by ID and deletes it without checking if the key belongs to the authenticated user. The endpoint also doesn't pass the current_user to the delete function for verification.

Impact

An authenticated attacker can enumerate and delete API keys belonging to other users by guessing or discovering their API key IDs. This allows account takeover, denial of service, and disruption of other users' integrations.

Recommendation

Modify the delete_api_key endpoint and function: (1) Pass current_user to the delete function; (2) In delete_api_key(), verify api_key.user_id == current_user.id before deletion; (3) Raise a 403 Forbidden error if the user doesn't own the key. Example: if api_key.user_id != user_id: raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail='Unauthorized')

Notes

Confirmed IDOR vulnerability. The delete_api_key_route endpoint at line 44-53 accepts an api_key_id and calls delete_api_key(db, api_key_id) without passing the current_user. The CRUD function delete_api_key() at crud.py:44-49 retrieves the API key by ID and deletes it without verifying ownership (api_key.user_id == current_user.id). Compare this to the GET endpoint at lines 17-28 which correctly filters by user_id, and the POST endpoint at lines 31-41 which correctly associates the key with user_id. An authenticated attacker can delete any user's API keys by guessing/enumerating UUIDs. Fix: Pass current_user to delete_api_key and verify api_key.user_id == current_user.id before deletion, returning 403 if unauthorized.

Developer Review Notes

Does not accept current_user as a parameter. Allowing deletion of any user's API keys even without permissions.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIlangflowall versions1.9.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for langflow. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update langflow to 1.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rf6x-r45m-xv3w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rf6x-r45m-xv3w is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rf6x-r45m-xv3w. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

**Detection Method:** Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan | Attribute | Value | |---|---| | Location | src/backend/base/langflow/api/v1/api_key.py:44-53 | | Practical Exploitability | High | | Developer Approver | [email protected] | ### Description The delete_api_key_route() endpoint accepts an api_key_id path parameter and deletes it with only a generic authentication check (get_current_active_user dependency). However, the delete_api_key() CRUD function does NOT verify that the API key belongs to the current user before deletion. ### Affected Code ``` @router.delete("/{api_key_id}", dependencies=[D
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rf6x-r45m-xv3w in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-rf6x-r45m-xv3w across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.