GHSA-rcvg-jj3g-rj7c
MEDIUMSensitive Data Disclosure Vulnerability in Connection Configuration Endpoints
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
ethyca-fidesReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
The Fides webserver has a number of endpoints that retrieve ConnectionConfiguration records and their associated secrets which can contain sensitive data (e.g. passwords, private keys, etc.). These secrets are stored encrypted at rest (in the application database), and the associated endpoints are not meant to expose that sensitive data in plaintext to API clients, as it could be compromising.
Fides's developers have available to them a Pydantic field-attribute (sensitive) that they can annotate as True to indicate that a given secret field should not be exposed via the API. The application has an internal function that uses sensitive annotations to mask the sensitive fields with a "**********" placeholder value.
This vulnerability is due to a bug in that function, which prevented sensitive API model fields that were nested below the root-level of a secrets object from being masked appropriately. Only the BigQuery connection configuration secrets meets these criteria: the secrets schema has a nested sensitive keyfile_creds.private_key property that is exposed in plaintext via the APIs.
Connection types other than BigQuery with sensitive fields at the root-level that are not nested are properly masked with the placeholder and are not affected by this vulnerability.
Impact
The Google Cloud secrets used for a Fides BigQuery integration may be retrieved in plaintext by any authenticated Admin UI user, except those with the Approver role. Any API users authorized to access the following endpoints may also retrieve the key in plaintext.
Endpoints impacted:
GET /api/v1/connectionsPATCH /api/v1/connectionsGET /api/v1/connection/{connection_key}PATCH /api/v1/system/{system_key}/connectionGET /api/v1/system/{system_key}GET /api/v1/system/{system_key}/connection
Connection config secret schemas impacted:
BigQuerySchema
Patches
The vulnerability has been patched in Fides version 2.37.0. Users are advised to upgrade to this version or later to secure their systems against this threat.
Users are also advised to rotate any Google Cloud secrets used for BigQuery integrations in their Fides deployments: https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/key-rotation
Workarounds
There are no workarounds.
Proof of concept
Multiple endpoints are impacted, but this PoC will use GET /api/v1/system/{system_key} as an example.
- Using the Admin UI, navigate to
/add-systems. Add and save a new systembq_poc. - In the integrations tab of the new system, configure and save a BigQuery integration with secrets.
- Log in as a different user with any role except Approver and navigate to the
/systemspage. - Open the network section of your browser's developer tools.
- Click on the
bq_pocsystem's meatball menu and then click edit. - In the network section of browser dev tools you will observe a HTTP GET http://localhost:8080/api/v1/system/bq_poc/ request. In the body of the JSON response the integration secrets values entered in Step 2 are exposed in plaintext i.e.
{
"secrets": {
"keyfile_creds": {
"type": "value",
"project_id": "value",
"private_key_id": "value",
"private_key": "value",
"client_email": "value",
"client_id": "value",
"auth_uri": "value",
"token_uri": "value",
"auth_provider_x509_cert_url": "value",
"client_x509_cert_url": "value"
}
}
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | ethyca-fides | all versions | 2.37.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ethyca-fides. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update ethyca-fides to 2.37.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rcvg-jj3g-rj7c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rcvg-jj3g-rj7c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-rcvg-jj3g-rj7c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rcvg-jj3g-rj7c in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-rcvg-jj3g-rj7c across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.