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HIGH severity

GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p

HIGHFix: Sylius/MolliePlugin#351

GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-639 vulnerability in sylius/mollie-plugin. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook

Also known asCVE-2026-68500
Published
Jul 31, 2026
Updated
Jul 31, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 15, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs32th percentile — riskier than 32% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.59%0.88%0.4%0.4%0.4%Aug 26Sep 26Sep 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 373,366 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐘sylius/mollie-plugin🐘sylius/mollie-plugin🐘sylius/mollie-plugin

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

The shop payment webhook POST /{_locale}/update-payment (route sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: id (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and orderId (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.

An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid paid Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim orderId. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to completed (or any other Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.

Patches

Fixed in versions 2.2.8, 3.2.4 and 3.3.1. The webhook now binds the payment to the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the request is acknowledged with HTTP 200 and no state change is applied. HTTP 200 is intentional, because Mollie retries the webhook on any non-2xx response.

The stored ID lives in one of two places depending on the checkout flow, and the fix reads both of them (mirroring CaptureAction):

  • payment.getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] for the standard Shop API and Apple Pay Direct flows, stored in CreatePaymentAction.
  • order.getMolliePaymentId() for the QR-code flow, which stores the ID on the order itself (QrCodeAction).

Reading only the payment details would reject legitimate QR-code payments, because their payment details carry no payment_mollie_id, so both sources must be consulted.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch the vulnerability at the project level by decorating the plugin's webhook controller. The decorator checks that the incoming Mollie id matches the id stored for that order before handing over to the original controller, so no plugin behaviour (state machine, logging) is lost and no extra Mollie API call is made. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x.

Step 1. Create the decorator

Create src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php in your Sylius project:

<?php

declare(strict_types=1);

namespace App\Controller\Mollie;

use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Order\Repository\OrderRepositoryInterface;
use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\PaymentWebhookController;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response;

final class SecurePaymentWebhookController
{
    public function __construct(
        private readonly PaymentWebhookController $inner,
        private readonly OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository,
    ) {
    }

    public function __invoke(Request $request): Response
    {
        $orderId = $request->get('orderId');
        $molliePaymentId = $request->get('id');

        if (null === $orderId || null === $molliePaymentId) {
            return ($this->inner)($request);
        }

        /** @var OrderInterface|null $order */
        $order = $this->orderRepository->findOneBy(['id' => $orderId]);
        if (null === $order) {
            return ($this->inner)($request);
        }

        $storedMollieId = $this->resolveStoredMollieId($order);

        // Reject any webhook whose Mollie id does not match the one stored for this order.
        // 200 is intentional: Mollie retries on any non-2xx response.
        if (null === $storedMollieId || $storedMollieId !== (string) $molliePaymentId) {
            return new JsonResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK);
        }

        return ($this->inner)($request);
    }

    private function resolveStoredMollieId(OrderInterface $order): ?string
    {
        $payment = $order->getLastPayment();
        $fromDetails = $payment?->getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] ?? null;
        if (null !== $fromDetails && '' !== $fromDetails) {
            return (string) $fromDetails;
        }

        // QR-code flow stores the Mollie id on the order itself.
        if (method_exists($order, 'getMolliePaymentId')) {
            $fromOrder = $order->getMolliePaymentId();
            if (null !== $fromOrder && '' !== $fromOrder) {
                return (string) $fromOrder;
            }
        }

        return null;
    }
}

Step 2. Register the decorator

Append to your project's config/services.yaml:

services:
    App\Controller\Mollie\SecurePaymentWebhookController:
        decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook
        public: true
        arguments:
            $inner: '@.inner'
            $orderRepository: '@sylius.repository.order'

decorates: keeps the original service ID, so the route _controller: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook keeps working with no route changes. @.inner is the original plugin controller.

Step 3. Clear the cache

bin/console cache:clear

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistsylius/mollie-pluginall versions2.2.8
🐘Packagistsylius/mollie-plugin3.0.0&&< 3.2.43.2.4
🐘Packagistsylius/mollie-plugin3.3.0&&< 3.3.13.3.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sylius/mollie-plugin. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update sylius/mollie-plugin to 2.2.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The shop payment webhook `POST /{_locale}/update-payment` (route `sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook`) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled parameters: `id` (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and `orderId` (the Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order. An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid **paid** Mollie payment ID, for example from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim `orderId`. The victim's orde
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p: sylius/mollie (High 7.5) | O3 Security