GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-639 vulnerability in sylius/mollie-plugin. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Sylius Mollie Plugin vulnerable to payment status forgery via the payment webhook
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 373,366 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
sylius/mollie-plugin🐘sylius/mollie-plugin🐘sylius/mollie-pluginReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
The shop payment webhook POST /{_locale}/update-payment (route
sylius_mollie_shop_payment_webhook) accepts two independent, attacker-controlled
parameters: id (the Mollie payment ID, verified against Mollie's API) and orderId (the
Sylius order ID, read directly from the database). The handler never verifies that the
Mollie payment belongs to the referenced order.
An unauthenticated attacker who holds any valid paid Mollie payment ID, for example
from a EUR 1 order they placed themselves, can submit it together with any victim
orderId. The victim's order payment is then transitioned to completed (or any other
Mollie-derived state) without any funds being transferred for that order. Sylius order IDs
are sequential integers, and the endpoint requires no authentication, CSRF token or rate
limiting, so the attack scales trivially across all pending orders.
Patches
Fixed in versions 2.2.8, 3.2.4 and 3.3.1. The webhook now binds the payment to
the order: it reads the Mollie payment ID stored server-side for that order when the payment
was created and compares it to the incoming Mollie payment ID. On mismatch the request is
acknowledged with HTTP 200 and no state change is applied. HTTP 200 is intentional,
because Mollie retries the webhook on any non-2xx response.
The stored ID lives in one of two places depending on the checkout flow, and the fix reads
both of them (mirroring CaptureAction):
payment.getDetails()['payment_mollie_id']for the standard Shop API and Apple Pay Direct flows, stored inCreatePaymentAction.order.getMolliePaymentId()for the QR-code flow, which stores the ID on the order itself (QrCodeAction).
Reading only the payment details would reject legitimate QR-code payments, because their
payment details carry no payment_mollie_id, so both sources must be consulted.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, patch the vulnerability at the project level by decorating the plugin's webhook controller. The decorator checks that the incoming Mollie id matches the id stored for that order before handing over to the original controller, so no plugin behaviour (state machine, logging) is lost and no extra Mollie API call is made. Works on both 2.2 and 3.x.
Step 1. Create the decorator
Create src/Controller/Mollie/SecurePaymentWebhookController.php in your Sylius project:
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Controller\Mollie;
use Sylius\Component\Core\Model\OrderInterface;
use Sylius\Component\Order\Repository\OrderRepositoryInterface;
use Sylius\MolliePlugin\Controller\Shop\PaymentWebhookController;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Request;
use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\Response;
final class SecurePaymentWebhookController
{
public function __construct(
private readonly PaymentWebhookController $inner,
private readonly OrderRepositoryInterface $orderRepository,
) {
}
public function __invoke(Request $request): Response
{
$orderId = $request->get('orderId');
$molliePaymentId = $request->get('id');
if (null === $orderId || null === $molliePaymentId) {
return ($this->inner)($request);
}
/** @var OrderInterface|null $order */
$order = $this->orderRepository->findOneBy(['id' => $orderId]);
if (null === $order) {
return ($this->inner)($request);
}
$storedMollieId = $this->resolveStoredMollieId($order);
// Reject any webhook whose Mollie id does not match the one stored for this order.
// 200 is intentional: Mollie retries on any non-2xx response.
if (null === $storedMollieId || $storedMollieId !== (string) $molliePaymentId) {
return new JsonResponse(null, Response::HTTP_OK);
}
return ($this->inner)($request);
}
private function resolveStoredMollieId(OrderInterface $order): ?string
{
$payment = $order->getLastPayment();
$fromDetails = $payment?->getDetails()['payment_mollie_id'] ?? null;
if (null !== $fromDetails && '' !== $fromDetails) {
return (string) $fromDetails;
}
// QR-code flow stores the Mollie id on the order itself.
if (method_exists($order, 'getMolliePaymentId')) {
$fromOrder = $order->getMolliePaymentId();
if (null !== $fromOrder && '' !== $fromOrder) {
return (string) $fromOrder;
}
}
return null;
}
}
Step 2. Register the decorator
Append to your project's config/services.yaml:
services:
App\Controller\Mollie\SecurePaymentWebhookController:
decorates: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhook
public: true
arguments:
$inner: '@.inner'
$orderRepository: '@sylius.repository.order'
decorates:keeps the original service ID, so the route_controller: sylius_mollie.controller.shop.payment_webhookkeeps working with no route changes.@.inneris the original plugin controller.
Step 3. Clear the cache
bin/console cache:clear
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | sylius/mollie-plugin | all versions | 2.2.8 |
| 🐘Packagist | sylius/mollie-plugin | ≥ 3.0.0&&< 3.2.4 | 3.2.4 |
| 🐘Packagist | sylius/mollie-plugin | ≥ 3.3.0&&< 3.3.1 | 3.3.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sylius/mollie-plugin. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update sylius/mollie-plugin to 2.2.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-rc52-c4hv-w89p across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.