How severe is GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r?

GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r has a CVSS score of 3.1/10, rated LOW. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r?

GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r affects the following packages: langchain-openai (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r?

Update langchain-openai to 1.1.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for langchain-openai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r was published on April 16, 2026 and was last updated on June 6, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r

LOW

GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r is a low-severity (CVSS 3.1) vulnerability in langchain-openai. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

langchain-openai: Image token counting SSRF protection can be bypassed via DNS rebinding

Also known asCVE-2026-41488PYSEC-2026-76

Published

Apr 16, 2026

Updated

Jun 6, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍langchain-openai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

langchain-openai's _url_to_size() helper (used by get_num_tokens_from_messages for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.

The practical impact is limited because the fetched response body is passed directly to Pillow's Image.open() to extract dimensions — the response content is never returned, logged, or otherwise exposed to the caller. An attacker cannot exfiltrate data from internal services through this path. A potential risk is blind probing (inferring whether an internal host/port is open based on timing or error behavior).

Affected versions

langchain-openai < 1.1.14

Patched versions

langchain-openai >= 1.1.14 (requires langchain-core >= 1.2.31)

Affected code

File: libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py — _url_to_size()

The vulnerable pattern was a validate-then-fetch with separate DNS resolution:

validate_safe_url(image_source, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)
# ... separate network operation with independent DNS resolution ...
response = httpx.get(image_source, timeout=timeout)

Fix

The fix replaces the validate-then-fetch pattern with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (SSRFSafeSyncTransport from langchain-core) that:

Resolves DNS once and validates all returned IPs against a policy (private ranges, cloud metadata, localhost, k8s internal DNS)
Pins the connection to the validated IP, eliminating the DNS rebinding window
Disables redirect following to prevent redirect-based SSRF bypasses

This fix was released in langchain-openai 1.1.14.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`langchain-openai`	all versions	1.1.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for langchain-openai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update langchain-openai to 1.1.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `langchain-openai`'s `_url_to_size()` helper (used by `get_num_tokens_from_messages` for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch. The practical impact is limited because the fetched response body is passed directly to Pillow's `Image.open()` to extract dimensions — the response content is never return

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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