GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h
Fix: elixir-ecto/postgrex@7cdedbdGHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h is a SQL Injection vulnerability in postgrex. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Postgrex: Channel-name SQL injection in `Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3`
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
postgrexReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
SQL injection in Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3: the channel argument is interpolated straight into LISTEN "..." / UNLISTEN "..." without escaping the " character. Any caller that lets a user influence the channel name (e.g. a pub/sub bridge that uses a tenant id or topic slug as the channel) and the name is not sanitized can execute arbitrary SQL on the notifications connection.
Only those using the Postgrex.Notifications directly or via a dependency, with a non-sanitized channel name are vulnerable. Ecto does not use Postgrex.Notifications by default, but you must validate if any other dependency does.
Details
PostgreSQL escapes a " inside a quoted identifier by doubling it to "". Postgrex doesn't do that doubling, so a " inside channel closes the identifier early and everything after it is parsed as SQL on the same connection.
The notifications connection runs as whatever DB role the app is configured with. Unlike the Postgrex.query/4 API, there's no extended-protocol guard here: LISTEN/UNLISTEN are sent as simple queries, so multi-statement payloads work and the attacker can chain ; CREATE TABLE …, ; DROP …, ; CREATE ROLE …, etc.
Impact
SQL injection on the notifications connection. Affects any application that calls Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3 (or unlisten/3) with a channel name derived from untrusted input. Executes as the configured DB user with no protocol-level limit on what can be chained, so the realistic blast radius is read/modify/destroy on any data the app's DB role can reach.
Fix
Upgrade to latest Postgrex v0.22.2 or later. Altenratively, sanitize any user input given as channel name by making sure it doesn't include quotes as well as null bytes (not strictly required, but recommended):
if String.contains?(channel_name, ["\"", "\0"]) do
raise "bad channel name"
end
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💧Hex | postgrex | ≥ 0.16.0&&< 0.22.2 | 0.22.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for postgrex. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update postgrex to 0.22.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-r73h-97w8-m54h across Hex dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.