CVE-2026-32687 — postgrex
Fix: elixir-ecto/postgrex@7cdedbdCVE-2026-32687 is a SQL Injection vulnerability in postgrex. A fix is available for postgrex — see the affected versions and patch details below.
SQL injection via channel name in Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3 and unlisten/3
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32687.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
postgrexReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
SQL injection in Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3: the channel argument is interpolated straight into LISTEN "..." / UNLISTEN "..." without escaping the " character. Any caller that lets a user influence the channel name (e.g. a pub/sub bridge that uses a tenant id or topic slug as the channel) and the name is not sanitized can execute arbitrary SQL on the notifications connection.
Only those using the Postgrex.Notifications directly or via a dependency, with a non-sanitized channel name are vulnerable. Ecto does not use Postgrex.Notifications by default, but you must validate if any other dependency does.
Details
PostgreSQL escapes a " inside a quoted identifier by doubling it to "". Postgrex doesn't do that doubling, so a " inside channel closes the identifier early and everything after it is parsed as SQL on the same connection.
The notifications connection runs as whatever DB role the app is configured with. Unlike the Postgrex.query/4 API, there's no extended-protocol guard here: LISTEN/UNLISTEN are sent as simple queries, so multi-statement payloads work and the attacker can chain ; CREATE TABLE …, ; DROP …, ; CREATE ROLE …, etc.
Impact
SQL injection on the notifications connection. Affects any application that calls Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3 (or unlisten/3) with a channel name derived from untrusted input. Executes as the configured DB user with no protocol-level limit on what can be chained, so the realistic blast radius is read/modify/destroy on any data the app's DB role can reach.
Fix
Upgrade to latest Postgrex v0.22.2 or later. Altenratively, sanitize any user input given as channel name by making sure it doesn't include quotes as well as null bytes (not strictly required, but recommended):
if String.contains?(channel_name, ["\"", "\0"]) do
raise "bad channel name"
end
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💧Hex | postgrex | ≥ 0.16.0&&< 0.22.2 | 0.22.2mix deps.update postgrex |
Affected Products
postgrexelixir-ectoDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for postgrex, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update postgrex to 0.22.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32687 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Until you can upgrade, make sure every query built from user input uses parameterised statements or a prepared-statement API rather than string concatenation, and reduce the database account's privileges so an injected query cannot read or alter data beyond what the feature needs.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-32687 in your dependencies?
Find it across Hex, including transitive dependencies.