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Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages expose database username via unconditional db.user span attributeGHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9

MEDIUMFix: open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js-contrib#3585

GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.8) CWE-532 vulnerability in @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver. A fix is available for @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-104872
Published
Updated
Affected
8 pkgs
Patched
8 / 8
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs15th percentile — riskier than 15% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

8 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

16other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-drivernpm
6.0Mdownloads / week
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tediousnpm
12.3Mdownloads / week
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledbnpm
5.2Mdownloads / week

Description

Impact

Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages recorded the database connection username as the db.user span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by enhancedDatabaseReporting or any other opt-in flag, and it was the default behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.

The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal:

  • Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology.
  • Role-encoded usernames (e.g. admin_readwrite, app_readonly_prod) useful for privilege inference.
  • Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.

Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):

PackageVulnerable rangePatched version
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver< 0.66.00.66.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex< 0.65.00.65.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose< 0.67.00.67.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql< 0.67.00.67.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2< 0.67.00.67.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb< 0.46.00.46.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg< 0.73.00.73.0
@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious< 0.40.00.40.0

Patches

Fixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585).

Upgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.

Workarounds

No configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the db.user attribute cannot be suppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before they leave the process:

// Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor
class StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor {
  onStart(span: Span) {
    span.setAttribute('db.user', null);
  }
  onEnd() {}
  shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); }
  forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); }
}

Users who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.

Affected Packages

8 total 8 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driverall versions0.66.0npm install @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver@0.66.0
📦npm@opentelemetry/instrumentation-tediousall versions0.40.0npm install @opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious@0.40.0
📦npm@opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledball versions0.46.0npm install @opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb@0.46.0
📦npm@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongooseall versions0.67.0npm install @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose@0.67.0
📦npm@opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysqlall versions0.67.0npm install @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql@0.67.0
📦npm@opentelemetry/instrumentation-knexall versions0.65.0npm install @opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex@0.65.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver to 0.66.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

Some `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages unconditionally emitted the db.user span attribute (database connection username) on every instrumented database operation. This was default behaviour, not gated by any opt-in flag. The username is forwarded to all configured observability backends (Jaeger, Zipkin,…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Update to fixed versions. Workaround: a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before export.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Multiple `@opentelemetry/instrumentation-*` packages recorded the database connection username as the `db.user` span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by `enhancedDatabaseReporting` or any other opt-in flag, and it was the **default** behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23. The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention i
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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