CVE-2026-104872 — @opentelemetry/instrument…

Impact

Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages recorded the database connection username as the db.user span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was not gated by enhancedDatabaseReporting or any other opt-in flag, and it was the default behaviour for all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.

The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal:

• Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology.
• Role-encoded usernames (e.g. admin_readwrite, app_readonly_prod) useful for privilege inference.
• Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.

Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):

Patches

Fixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585).

Upgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.

Workarounds

No configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the db.user attribute cannot be suppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before they leave the process:

// Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor
class StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor {
  onStart(span: Span) {
    span.setAttribute('db.user', null);
  }
  onEnd() {}
  shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); }
  forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); }
}

Users who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.