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Dgraph: Zero Unauthenticated HTTP Admin removeNode Denial of ServiceGHSA-qj98-gp63-54xj

Fix: dgraph-io/dgraph@c32f604

GHSA-qj98-gp63-54xj is a Missing Authentication vulnerability in github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25. A fix is available for github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-102748
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs41th percentile — riskier than 41% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Dgraph v25.3.8 exposes a Zero HTTP administrative surface that is unauthenticated when port 6080 is reachable.

The exposed routes include:

  • /state
  • /assign
  • /removeNode
  • /moveTablet

An unauthenticated request to /removeNode?id=1&group=0 on a single-node standalone deployment breaks the Zero control plane and leaves Alpha repeatedly failing to reconnect to localhost:5080.

Details

The issue exists because Zero administrative HTTP endpoints are registered directly without any authentication or IP-whitelist wrapper.

Relevant code paths:

  • worker/server_state.go:41
  • dgraph/cmd/zero/run.go:295-301
  • dgraph/cmd/zero/http.go:106-129
  • dgraph/cmd/zero/zero.go:475-477

The relevant behavior is:

  • disable-admin-http=false by default
  • /removeNode accepts attacker-controlled id and group
  • removeNode forwards those directly into Server.RemoveNode
  • for group=0, Server.RemoveNode immediately calls ProposePeerRemoval

This means a remote unauthenticated caller can directly trigger destructive membership operations if 6080 is exposed.

PoC

Read state without authentication

curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/state

Observed response included:

  • Zero node id=1
  • groupId=0
  • leader=true
  • cluster topology and tablet state
<img width="1878" height="810" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c6a0001c-bcf7-45b6-a301-481f918be98a" />

Write-capable route without authentication

curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:6080/assign?what=nsids&num=1'

Observed response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
{"startId":"1", "endId":"1", "readOnly":"0"}

This confirms the admin plane is not merely informational.

<img width="1877" height="805" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/caf60927-83ba-495d-8c55-e48343b8a2c7" />

Destructive unauthenticated removeNode

curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:6080/removeNode?id=1&group=0'

Observed result:

curl: (52) Empty reply from server
<img width="1877" height="806" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a837c385-1c2d-42b6-a5c9-0d93a974ff4e" />

Immediately afterward:

curl -i http://127.0.0.1:6080/health

Observed result:

curl: (56) Recv failure: Connection reset by peer
<img width="786" height="47" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd5e977d-d046-4626-b3df-155b141564fa" />

Alpha health was still locally reachable, but Alpha logs began repeatedly reporting:

dial tcp [::1]:5080: connect: connection refused
<img width="1688" height="197" alt="图片" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8ae3bb84-65bc-4951-ad32-5e1c3231c894" />

This confirms the request reached the destructive path and disrupted the Zero control plane.

Impact

Any deployment that exposes Zero HTTP on 6080 exposes destructive unauthenticated administrative capabilities.

An attacker can:

  • read cluster topology and control-plane metadata
  • allocate IDs and timestamps
  • invoke destructive membership actions
  • disrupt the Zero control plane
  • indirectly destabilize Alpha nodes that depend on Zero connectivity

This is a high-value unauthenticated administrative exposure and, in the reproduced case, a practical denial of service against the control plane.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25all versions25.4.0go get github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25@v25.4.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25 to 25.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qj98-gp63-54xj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Dgraph `v25.3.8` exposes a Zero HTTP administrative surface that is unauthenticated when port `6080` is reachable. The exposed routes include: - `/state` - `/assign` - `/removeNode` - `/moveTablet` An unauthenticated request to `/removeNode?id=1&group=0` on a single-node standalone deployment breaks the Zero control plane and leaves Alpha repeatedly failing to reconnect to `localhost:5080`. ### Details The issue exists because Zero administrative HTTP endpoints are registered directly without any authentication or IP-whitelist wrapper. Relevant code paths: - `worker/server_
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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