GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5
MEDIUMHome Assistant vulnerable to account takeover via auth_callback login
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
homeassistantReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Part of the Cure53 security audit of Home Assistant.
The audit team’s analyses confirmed that the redirect_uri and client_id are alterable when logging in. Consequently, the code parameter utilized to fetch the access_token post-authentication will be sent to the URL specified in the aforementioned parameters.
Since an arbitrary URL is permitted and homeassistant.local represents the preferred, default domain likely used and trusted by many users, an attacker could leverage this weakness to manipulate a user and retrieve account access. Notably, this attack strategy is plausible if the victim has exposed their Home Assistant to the Internet, since after acquiring the victim’s access_token, the adversary would need to utilize it directly towards the instance to achieve any pertinent malicious actions.
To achieve this compromise attempt, the attacker must send a link with a redirect_uri that they control to the victim’s own Home Assistant instance. In the eventuality the victim authenticates via the said link, the attacker would obtain code sent to the specified URL in redirect_uri, which can then be leveraged to fetch an access_token.
An attacker could increase the efficacy of this strategy by registering a nearly identical domain to homeassistant.local, which at first glance may appear legitimate and thereby obfuscate any malicious intentions.
Nonetheless, owing to the requirements for victim interaction and Home Assistant instance exposure to the Internet, this severity rating was consequently downgraded to Low.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | homeassistant | all versions | 2023.9.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for homeassistant. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update homeassistant to 2023.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-qhhj-7hrc-gqj5 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.