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Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

CVE-2023-50715 — homeassistant

MEDIUMFix: home-assistant/core@dbfc5ea

CVE-2023-50715 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) Information Exposure vulnerability in homeassistant. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for homeassistant — see the affected versions and patch details below.

User accounts disclosed to unauthenticated actors on the LAN

Also known asGHSA-jqpc-rc7g-vf83PYSEC-2026-1451
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.9%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs60th percentile — riskier than 60% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.47%0.94%1.41%0.2%0.9%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍homeassistant

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network.

Details

Starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when:

  • The request is not authenticated and
  • The request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, fd00::/8, ::ffff:10.0.0.0/104, ::ffff:172.16.0.0/108, ::ffff:192.168.0.0/112)

The rationale behind this is to make the login more user-friendly (see release blog post) and an experience better aligned with other applications that have multiple user-profiles.

However, as a result, all accounts are displayed regardless of them having logged in or not and for any device that navigates to the server. This disclosure is mitigated by the fact that it only occurs for requests originating from a LAN address. But note that this applies to the local subnet where Home Assistant resides and to any private subnet that can reach it.

PoC

  1. Place a Home Assistant instance on a private subnet, i.e., 192.168.1.0/24.
  2. Create a few users, let's say, three.
  3. From any (or another) private subnet on the LAN, like 192.168.2.0/24, open an incognito browser window (to ensure that the browser has no cookies from Home Assistant and therefore is demonstrably unauthenticated) and navigate to the Home Assistant URL.
  4. The login page will display all three users, including their profile photo.

Impact

The following CVSS string could be shaped to describe the overall impact of this issue: AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

As seen, the Exploitability metrics are high, and the Impact metrics are low. This is fitting because the problem does not constitute a critical one, but at the same time, it is trivial to exploit. Still, since the mitigation can be so easily implemented in code to eliminate a typical case of information disclosure, it would certainly be worth pursuing.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIhomeassistantall versions2023.12.3pip install --upgrade 'homeassistant==2023.12.3'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
home-assistanthome-assistant
< 2023.12.3
range
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for homeassistant, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update homeassistant to 2023.12.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2023-50715 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network. ### Details Starting the [Home Assistant 2023.12 release](https://www.home-assistant.io/blog/2023/12/06/release-202312/), the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from the Local Area Network. Tests showed that this occurs when: - The request is not authenticated and - The request originated locally, meaning on the Home Assistant host local subnet or any other private subnet (`10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2023-50715 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2023-50715: homeassistant — Fixed in 2023.12.3