CVE-2026-91130 — homeassistant
Fix: home-assistant/frontend@b8c201bCVE-2026-91130 is a CWE-80 vulnerability in homeassistant. A fix is available for homeassistant — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Home Assistant: XSS in Statistics Graph Card
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-91130.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
homeassistantReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An authenticated party can add a malicious name to any statistics-capable entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who views a Statistics Graph card containing that entity, when they hover over any data point on the chart.
Payload <img width="1529" height="441" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6926ce53-75fb-455a-bd4e-0c5281e8bed8" />
Payload triggering <img width="835" height="469" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bb9d17a-c123-4d44-8471-35097f65ddd2" />
An alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the provider of the integration (e.g. Tibber, Shelly, or any HACS integration), and is exploited that way through the default name — without requiring any direct access to the Home Assistant instance. This is the same supply-chain vector as CVE-2025-62172.
Details
The Statistics Graph card renders entity names in ECharts tooltips as raw HTML. The offending
line is in src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts:
Where param.seriesName is interpolated verbatim into the returned HTML string:
return `${time}${param.marker} ${param.seriesName}: ${value}`;
No call to filterXSS() is made — unlike the Energy dashboard chart, which was patched as part
of CVE-2025-62172:
// FIXED in energy-chart-options.ts:268
return `${param.marker} ${filterXSS(param.seriesName!)}: ...`;
The statistics-chart component was not updated when the Energy chart was patched, leaving the
same class of vulnerability in place.
The existing entity and payload used for CVE-2025-62172 is also a valid exploit for this vulnerability: <img width="962" height="500" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/35c84dcd-64d4-47b6-8df2-6c8b63cac880" />
The name value flows through the following chain:
-
nameis set fromgetStatisticLabel(this.hass, statistic_id, meta): https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/components/chart/statistics-chart.ts#L411 -
getStatisticLabelis defined here and callscomputeStateName(entity): https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/data/recorder.ts#L329-L339 -
computeStateNameis defined here — no HTML encoding is applied: https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/common/entity/compute_state_name.ts
The only transformation applied to the name is replacing underscores with spaces
(computeObjectId(entityId).replace(/_/g, " ")), which does not prevent HTML injection.
NB: Do note that only the fields Mean, State, Sum and Change are vulnerable. The top 3 (Min, Max, Mean) or the bottom 3 (State, Sum, Change) are selected by default though, making it vulnerable by default:
<img width="105" height="216" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/7a784c90-cca5-46da-bcb9-6942ad81da0c" />
Another requirement is that the Chart Type is of type Line, not Bar, which is also the default: <img width="133" height="91" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4f131495-9000-4a80-808b-bf4be9f7a2f6" />
PoC
-
In Settings → Devices & Services → Helpers, click + Create Helper. (For testing)
-
Choose Template → Template sensor. Fill in the form:
- Name:
test <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain) /> - State template:
{{0.00000001*as_timestamp(states('sensor.date_time_iso'))}} - Unit of measurement:
kWh - State class:
Measurement - Click Submit.
- Name:
- Open a dashboard and add a Statistics Graph card targeting the new sensor:
NB: Set time-window to 5 minutes for ease of testing so you see data quickly
-
Hover over any data point on the chart.
-
The
onerrorhandler fires —alert(document.domain)executes in the browser or HTML-injection appears depending on the payload
** Exact helper as described here** <img width="802" height="441" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/09284c10-bc39-410a-aff0-307e0bfd0502" />
Own sensor <img width="962" height="500" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/35c84dcd-64d4-47b6-8df2-6c8b63cac880" />
Own sensor 2 <img width="835" height="469" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bb9d17a-c123-4d44-8471-35097f65ddd2" />
Impact
The vulnerability can be exploited remotely via the supply-chain vector: any integration that automatically names entities (e.g. energy providers like Tibber) could deliver the payload without requiring the attacker to have any account on the target Home Assistant instance. This mirrors the exact attack path described in CVE-2025-62172. The most likely exploit is also through energy providers due to them providing multiple entities compatible with statistic graphs.
Compared to CVE-2025-62172, this has the requirement that you add a Statistics Graph to your dashboard (or somehow view the entity in a Statistics Graph through other means, if such a method exists). Otherwise the attack flow is identical. Suggested CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
The root cause — missing filterXSS() on param.seriesName — is identical to the already-fixed
Energy dashboard. The Statistics Graph card, which uses a shared statistics-chart component,
was not included in the previous fix scope.
Credit: Robin Lunde - https://robinlunde.com
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | homeassistant | all versions | 2026.7.0pip install --upgrade 'homeassistant==2026.7.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for homeassistant, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update homeassistant to 2026.7.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-91130 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Escape or sanitise the affected output on the server side rather than relying on client-side filtering, and add a Content-Security-Policy that blocks inline script execution so injected markup cannot run even if it reaches the page.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-91130 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.